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PREFACE
Friedrich von Holstein, a Vortragender Rat in the
Berlin Foreign Office, influenced German foreign policy dur
ing the Wllhelr.t&n Bra.

He appeared as the controversial and

mysterious figure who guided the Second Reich through the era
of Veltpolitlk.

Holstein’s contemporaries, as well as histo

rians, asserted that his influence was a contributive factor
In causing Germany to fight World War I.

To ascertain the

extent of his influence, on© must consider his actions in a
particular instance.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is

to examine a specific diplomatic incident and, at least in
this instance, place in proper perspective Holstein’s in
fluence on German foreign policy.

A significant problem,

which permits an examination of his influence, is the attempt
at an alliance between Great Britain and Germany in 1901.
Germany, since the Bismarckian Era, had always ex
pressed an interest in concluding an alliance with Great
Britain.

Her leaders realised that the geographic position

of Germany exposed her frontiers to French and Russian at
tack and that only a British alliance would provide the pro
tection against possible invasion.

The possibility of Ger

many concluding such an agreement arore during 1901, but
the proposal failed to materialize.
iil

Failure to conclude an

alliance supposedly resulted from the actions of none other
than Friedrich von Holstein*
#

#

#

«•

For matters of simplification and clarification the
following changes have been carried out through the entire
text*

In place of umlauted German letters an **eH has been

inserted* and all headings on diplomatic exchanges have been
limited to the surname of the correspondent*
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CHAPT'TI I
FRIEDRICH VON HOLSTEIN AND THE BISMARCKIAN ERA
On April 21^, 1337# Friedrich von Holstein was b o m

at Schwedt an den Oder.^*

As a member of an old Mecklenburg

family, Holstein inherited, along with a tradition of mili
tary service, a fairly substantial fortune.

His parents,

Karoline and August von Holstein, provided their only child
with the normal upbringing due a son of the lower Prussian
o
nobility.
Ee spent ills first eleven years at the country
estate of freeenow with occasional journeys to

B e r l i n .

3

Young Friedrich had, for the most part, a happy childhood,
but at times he exhibited a wi fchuravr and quiet side to his
character.

His tendency to withdraw, which later contributed

to his gloomy disposition, he Inherited from his father
PJhen Revolution came In 13*|.3, the elder Holstein
^Helmuth Rogge (el.), Friedrich von Holstein Lebensbekenntnia im Briefer an elne Frau (BerllyTj ¥ er lag Ull3t ein,
I9J£), pp. 3—U-"* Her"eaTF--:-r ~cTteT~as Rogge, Lehensbekenntnla.
2q. P. Gooch, "Holstein* Oracle of the Wilhelmstras36*” Studies In German History (Hew Yorki Longmans, Green and
Co., l^liB), p. 391. Hereafter cited as Gooch, Holstein Oracle.
^Norman Rich and K. H. Fisher (ed.), The Holstein
Papers (£4. vols•; Cambridge: At the University Press, 195?196377 1# x. Hereafter cited as Holstein Pape >s.
^Rogge, Lob er.sb ek enn tn 1a , pp. xvi -xvi i , I4

2
sold his estate and moved his family to Karlstein, the home
of his sister, Mlnne von Holtzendorff, near Zehden an der
Oder.'*

At Karlstein Friedrick formed a close friendship with

his cousin and life-lor.g correspondent, Ida von Btuelpnagel,
nee Holtzendorff.^

During the lP60fs, as their friendship

grew, the family circle expected ^rledrich and Ida to marry,
ri

but they remained only confidential friends# *
The Holstein family, when not In Karlstein, resided
n
in Berlin or traveled in France, Switzerland, and Italy#
On the family trips abroad Friedrick developed a great facil
ity in foreign languages which later contributed to his rapid
rise In the diplomatic service
Holstein's education was under the supervision of a
private tutor until lS£3 , when he entered the University of
Berlin#

He concentrated his studies In the area of law, but

his real interest was for a military career#

Holstein, while

at the University, attempted to enter the army but failed to
pass his medical examination.^*
^Holstein Papers. Ill,

H© soon obtained his law de3*

^Throughout his life, Holstein maintained an avid
correspondence with Ida von 3tuolpnagel to whom ho revealed a
great deal of information concerning his role in the Foreign
Office. These letters provided on© of the first major, reli
able sources dealing with Holstein as published in Hogg©,
Leben sbekennfcn is •
^Rogge, Leben abek enntn1s, p. xiv#
^Holstein
I,W x.
__ Panere,
Ay
*
^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 391.

^%olstein ihpers, I, x

3
gree, and in l8£6 he entered th© Prussian civil service.

For

the next four years he served as an official In the City
Court of B e r l i n . ^

It was during these years that Count Al

fred von Schlieffen, later Chief of the Prussian General
Staff, introduced him to Berlin society.^
Apparently dissatisfied with the civil service, Hol
stein, in i860, applied for a transfer to the Prussian diplo
matic service.

He received a provisional transfer but only

as a result of the influence of Count Otto von Bismarck.^3
His first diplomatic appointment followed on December 6 , i860,
when he became an attach© in the Prussian Embassy at St.
Petersburg.^
sador.

At th© time Bismarck was the Prussian Ambas

Thus began Holstein's thirty year period of associa

tion with the future German Chancellor.

Bismarck reported

that Holstein was eager, industrious, intelligent, though
awkward in society, and somewhat dominated by prejudice . ^
^ F r i e d r i c h von Trotha, Fritz von Holstein als Kenach
und Polltiker (Berlin* Verlag RTc'hard Schroed@r,193^)» p.
Hereafter cited as Trotha, Holstein als Mensch.
^ G o o c h , Holstein Oracle, p. 391.
•^Holstein Papers, 1, x.
^ X b i d . , Ill, 3.
^Goo c h , Holstein Oracle, pp. 391-92.
According to Buelow, Holstein *s inability to advance socially
In Russia later led him to oppose the pro-Hussian policy of
the Chancellor.
This appears quite unlikely.
Prince Bernard
von Buelow, Memoirs of Prince von Buelow, trans. F, A. Voigt
(h vols•; Boston: LFttle, Brown and Co., 1931), IV, 607.
Hereafter cited as Buelow, Memoirs.

fc

The Ambassador Introduced him to the Russian Foreign Minister,
Count Karl Nesselrode, as w *a future diplomatl1
Holstein, while in Russia, developed a close and In
timate relationship with rI rnnrok’s family.

He appeared to

the family as merely another one of Its members•

Both Her

bert or?d W 5H i mi, the Ambassador ’© two sore, looked upon him
as a comrade.

During the I 87O ’,® there vere even rumors of a

possible marriage between Holstein and Marie von Bismarck,
the Ambassador’s only daughter
In April, 1863, Holstein returned to Berlin to talc©
his final diplomatic examinations.

Ill-health and the tragic

death of his father postponed the examinations until May,
1863#

His next appointment was to the unstimulating Embas

sy at Bio de Janeiro, Brazil, where he remained only a year.
Holstein’s next assignment cam© during the war against Den
mark in 1861]., when he accompanied ^leld Marshall Wpangel, th©
Commander-In-Chief of the Austro-Prussian forces, as the as
sistant to the diplomatic representative of the Foreign Of
fice.^

That same year Holstein served as © member of the

Prussian delegation at th© bonaon Conference, called to solve
^•^Crooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 391.
x7lbld., pp. 391-92#
13Holsteln Papers, IIT, 3» 2ls.
^Gooch, Holatain Oracle. p. 393«

5
th© Schleswig-Holstein question,

The Conference failed, and

Holstein remained in London as a regular member of th© Prus
sian diplomatic ataff.^O
fortunate.

His stay in Great Britain was un

He disliked both the weather and British snubbing

of Prussians due to the antagonism resulting from the Danish
war •^
Holstein, in the summer of 1 % 5 , took a holiday in
the United States.

Re war- so taken with America that he re

quested and received an appointment to the Prussian Embassy
in Washington,

Holstein was impressed by his visits to Hew

"ork City and an excursion into the West, but he showed a
particular interest in the legislative form of government,
which he deemed as the future political system of

G e r m a n y .

^2

In Washington, Holstein developed a romantic attachm<nt for the wife of Urited States Senator Charles Sumner,
the Chairmen of th© Senate Foreign Relations Committee.^3
The romance reached such a serious nature that the Prussian
government recalled Holstein from his post.

Possibly th©

romantic incident influenced his future Ilf© as, supposedly,
^ Holstein P a p e r s , I , xl. •

^Cooch, Holstein Orscl e, pp. 392-93.
22IM*« * PH* 393—

Hogge, hebensbeker»ntris,

pp. 14.9-61$,.
^3For further details concerning the romantic affair
sec Ceorv© V. F. Ballgerten, "Fritz von Holstein Geheimnls,"
Historisoh© Zeitschrift, CLXXVII ( 1 9 S U ) , 75-03*

6
2».
happened with the controversial Arnisn affair of the l870*s. ^
In 1867 Holstein returned from th© United States and
never again left Europe*

he received immediately a post in

th© Prussian Embassy at Copenhagen, where his dissatisfaction
rivaled that experienced in London.

The legation suffered

strict social isolation, ns Danish society hated the Prus
sians as a result of the recent war-.‘~5
Early in 1 Q6 %

Holstein hegor n three year leave of

absence from the diplomatic s e r v i c e . H e

and a number of

his Belgian friends formed the Rhine lowing Company with
hopes of gaining considorable financial benefit from an in
vestment in a new method of canal transport.27

Holstein in

vested heavily in tne project, Which eventually proved un
profitable.

In fact he lost a substantial portion of his

fairly large inheritance.^
iiolstein returned to active diplomatic service in
duly, 1870, when war threatened, with

France.

**9

Bismarck,

^'Gordon A. Craig, From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects
of German Statecraft {Balt5.-m.ore: ~Joteslopk 1ns Press, 19$Bj,
p. pIT. Hereafter cTted as Craig, From Bismarck, cf. pp. 8-13,
^?Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. 39U.-95*
26liolstGin Papers, IX, 29.
2?There was some speculation that Holstein1s absence
from the diplomatic service indicated that be was conducting
some secret assignment for Bismarck.
Gooch, HoistoIn Oracle,
p. 398.
c ^Holstein loaners, III, 2lj *

^ G o o c h , Holstein Oracle, p. 395.

?
who desired to know the position of the Italian government in
th© Franeo-Prussian War, dispatched Holstein on a secret mis
sion to Italy for the purpose of discovering the attitude of
certain Italian political groups•

H© successfully completed

his assignment and once again confirmed Bismarck’s belief In
his ability and usefulness.31
For a brief time in 1870 Holstein served in the Po
litical Division of the Foreign. Ministry, but he disliked the
dull office work, particularly when war raged In France.
again attempted to enter the army but failed.

He

In January,

1871, he appeared unsolicited at Bismarck’s headquarters in
Versailles, where he hoped to gain an assignment«

Bismarck

allowed him to remain In Paris and eventually attached him
to his personal staff.

Following the war, Holstein remained

In France and served In minor positions, ?,neluding an appoint
ment to the staff of Count Alfred von Waldersee, who later
served Holstein as an intermediary with Kaiser Wilhelm II.32
The nature of Holstein’s life changed after he re
ceived the appointment of Second Secretary In the Imperial
Embassy at Paris In November, 1871.33

He appeared to have

adopted the life of a diplomat as he proved successful in his
Paris post and solved, though tragically, his problems with
3%iol3tein Papers, I, 1*.2-1*5•
3^1bid., III, 29.
32ibid.

33Ibid.

8
th© towing company*

In 1873 the towing venture proved com

pletely unprofitable, and he withdrew from Its Board of Direc
tors*

He suffered further financial loss in the economic

crash of 1373* when he lost the remainder of his fortune.
His financial losses forced him to depend solely on his- small
official salary and resulted in th© frugal existence that
characterised the rest of his life*3^
Supposedly more Influential on Holstein’s life was
his involvement with Count Harry von A m i m -Suckow*35

In 18?1

Count Arnim, influential In court circles and a favorite of
Kaiser Wilhelm I, received the appointment of ambassador to
France*3&

Arnim, who desired to become chancellor, disagreed

with Bismarck’s policy toward the French government and in
stituted his own

policy*

37

The Chancellor knew that Arnim

disregarded his instructions, and in 16714. he obtained the
Count’s removal*

Arnim*s successor. Prince Chlodwig zu

Hohenlohe-Sshillingsfuerst, reported that certain documents
were missing from the embassy files.

Bismarck requested Axrim

to return the documents, but h© declined.

The Chancellor fol

lowed by charging Arnim with illegally removing documents
3%bld., i n ,

29-30.

35uorman Rich, "Holstein and the Arnim Affair," The
Journal of Modern History, XXVIII (March, 19?6>), 33* Herea/ter cited as Me$TJ HArnim Affair*”
36&ooch,

Holstein Oracle, pp. 399-Ij.OO*

37Holsteln Papers, II, 32n. 2.
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from the government files*3®
In th© ensuing trial Arnim*s defense counsel charged
that Holstein, under official orders, reported the activities
of the Ambassador to Bismarck*

The Chancellor immediately

summoned Holstein as a witness for the government*

Thereupon

Arnim*s counsel withdrew th© charge stating It w a s made on
Insufficient Information*^

Holstein was Innocent of the spy

c h a r g e s ^ and testified that he remained on good relations
with Arnim until 1873* when It became evident that the Ambas
sador actually worked against official policy*

Holstein

said that he then requested a transfer, but Arnim refused
and kept M m

at his Paris post.-**

The trial finally ended

with Arnim receiving a short jail sentence, which he avoided
by fleeing to Switzerland where he soon d l e d , ^
On the basis of Holstein* s testimony hie only respon
sibility for Arnim*e removal was that he wrote various crit
ical letter© in which he commented on the Amlse-Piamarolc
quarrel and recommended the transfer of the Ambassador,^3
3^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp* 399-1*00,
3 %o l s t e i n Papers, I, 96*
PP. 36-37*

HI eh, ”A m i m Affair”,

M ^Bolateln Papers, I, xii,
^ I b i d . , Ill, 36-37*
b^Goaoh, Holstein Oracle, p# 100 ,

Wpich,

"Arnim Affair,” pp, hi, ph.

10

Holstein tws lawfully guiltless*^ but those in opposition to
Bismarck--the court circle, A m i n ’s many frlends,ultramon
tanes displeased with the Knlturkampf, and gossips--clamored
and spread the rumor that Holstein was a dishonorable, vile
spy*

Later when Holstein achieved greater control and in

fluence, bis contemporaries and e n e m i e s ^ interpreted his
role in th© Arnim affair as an explanation for his twisted
nature, which verged on a persecutlon-manla}^ his t e n d e n c y
for intrigue; the reason for opposing Bismarck after 1890;U-7
VtNeither the Foreign Ministry files, the records of
th© Arnim trial, nor the four volumes of The Holstein Papera
indicated that Holstein *s role in th© Arnim t’
r iaT was morally
wrong, dishonorable, or that his life was greatly affected by
the incident* Holstein Papers, I, xii•
^ O n e of th© central problems involved with the study
of Holstein is what was t h e true nature of the man, and how
did this affect his influence on German foreign policy, if
It did at all*
All the specific studies or illusions made
to Holstein, until the publication of his letters, pictured
him, predominantly because of his implications In the Arnim
trial, as a man of evil influence, and an intriguer, suffer
ing from partial mental derangement,
For a possible excep
tion see Trotha, Holstein als Mensch*
^ T r o t h a , in her sympathetic treatment, Holstein als
Mensch, p* 33, argued that Holstein was not pathoTogTcaTly
disturbed, sullen, crabby, odd, or basically eccentric*
UT^hen Bismarck fell from power in i890, Holstein re
mained at his post and obtained influence over foreign pol
icy*
The degree of his influence corresponded to that of the
succeeding Chancellors under whom he served*
These facts
caused some speculation, now disproven, that he was involved
in an intrigue to remove the Chancellor*
His contemporaries
and historians claimed that behind the fall of Bismarck were
the workings of Holstein's revenge for having been used as
the scapegoat in the Arnim trial* As far as Holstein was
concerned, he did not blame Bismarck for involving him in
the Arnim episode, but as he wrote in his memoirs in 1907,
Count Joseph Radowitz, Vortra&ender Rat in the Foreign Office

11
and th© factor that forced him to withdraw from society and
become a recluse•

Highly exaggerated, his contemporaries

declared that he was transformed from a 11debonairn young dip*
lomat into a social outcast*

Holstein, however, suffered no

more from social ostracism than any other adherent of Bis*
marck.^
His social difficulties ’were no greater than those
of most Germans, when considering the nature of the l8?0!s —
the opposition to Bismarck and the treatment received by
Prussians in Paris

Holstein's anti-social orientation

appeared much earlier in his life,-50 well before the Arnim
affair, and as early as his stay In St. P e t e r s b u r g *^1

His

father wrote him in Russia admonishing him for not taking
a more active part in

it was not that society

society.52

from 1872 to l87f|, was responsible for his involvement in th©
trial. Holstein felt that possibly R a d o w i h e l d some secret
with which he blackmailed Bismarck into forcing the trial.
According to Holstein, R&dowits favored the dismissal of
Arnim, not Bismarck.
This raises the question where did Holstein obtain
his information for labelling Radowit£ as th© culprit? Prom
Bismarck, who possibly hoped to keep Holstein in the dark as
to how he, the Chancellor, was responsible for summoning him
from Paris to testify? There is also the fact that Holstein
hated Radowits, who helped implement Holstein's removal as
on© of the secretaries at the Congress of Berlin. Holstein
^8Ibld.,

I,

xll.

Rich, "Arnim Affair,"

^ Holstein Papers, I , xl 1.
S °I M d . . I l l ,
^ R io h ,

211.-28.

" A rn im A f f a i r , "

p.

52.

^ H o l s t e i n Papers. III, 3“2 3 .

pp.

36-3?.
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avoided him but more that he avoided society.53

His friends,

though few in number, wore close and never was he socially
(i^l

isolated*^

^

Holstein wrote in 1876 of how lonely and un-

oheerful his life was; h o w e v e r , h e made no connection be
tween his solitary existence and the effects of the Arnim
a f f a i r * 5^

After his appointment to the Berlin Foreign Office

In 1876, his social relations continued to decline, but this
fact must not be over-exaggerated in light of hi s enormous
correspondence 'with all types of acquaintances and hi3 asso
ciations with many political figures•^

Once questioned on

his unsociable nature, Holstein replied, !ffTh© civil service
^jcbld.. I, xll.
5^ft*otha, Holstein als Henseh, p. 91l.
^ H o l s t e i n Papers. Ill, 1*0. no. 21. In 1«77 he wrote
"You know my passion for society* I never go out at all, be
cause beyond what I have now, I want nothing and aspire to
nothing, not even a wife."
Ibid., ijlu
^Interesting and'of unknowable significance, Hol
stein wrote in 1877 that on© Robert Keudell, was black
mailing him, or at least threatening to, and that the inci
dent may damage his relations with Bismarck as "at all
events this much la certain, that the whole business, with
th© annoyance it has caused me • • • has had consequences
affecting my whole life.” Just exactly what Holstein meant
by the above statement is not known or the nature of th©
quarre1 wlth Keude11• Ibid*, III, b5n• 1*
r**7
J Rich stated, in his astute article on Holstein and
the Arnim trial, the host argument against the Arnim affair
changing the nature of Holstein*a life and character*
He
said if Holstein possessed a somewhat unnatural character
and made mistakes in his political judgments, "1t was not
for want of contact with other people or with ‘reality.1"
Rich, "Arnim Affair," p. $ 2 •

13
has destroyed me as a human being*1

r*

Whatever the reason

Tor Holstein's anti-social tendencies, tne effect of one
Ariiim trial, at least in a subconscious sense, cannot be disregarded as having molded ais strange character*^
Uols bein drew closer to Bismarck during the 1870's*
In these years the nasure and degree or his influence de
pended upon his personal relations with the Chancellor and
the lauter's confidence in his ambitious assistant*^

The

Chancellor possessed valid reasons for employing Holstein in
matters that dealt with both internal and foreign affairs * ^
He was a meritable drafting officer, proficient in the nec
essary technical s k i l l s , ^

reliable, conscientious,^3 and

possessed a superb knowledge of languages,^! as well as an
Immense capacity for work*

The Chancellor employed him as

his personal secretary at both Berlin and Varzin, the country
estate of Bismarck*

At times he appointed him to the vacant

positions of officials who were on leave from the Foreign
F* Gooch, “Baron von Holstein., the Mystery Man
of the German Foreign Office 1890-1906,11 *fhe Cambridge His
torical Journal, 1, (1923 )$ 7In* 2* Hereafter cited as
Gooch, “Mystery Man*1*
^Rich,

“Arnim Affair,” pp* S2-5>3*

^ Holstein Papers, II, xi •
^ G o o c h , Holstein Oracle, pp* ij.O3-lj.05>*
k^Craig, From Bismarck, p* 39*
^Buelow, Memoirs, IV, 282.

6t)lbld», 5^3.

Iti
Ministry*^

Bismarck, In return for Holstein's services

granted him the privilege of conducting an extensive private
correspondence, through which he supplied information not
usually found in official communications.

It was an indubi

table fact that he served as a remarkably well-informed as
si s t a n t * ^
Bismarck, In 1875# appointed Holstein First Secretary
in the Paris E m b a s s y * T h a t same year he received the offer
of posts as First Secretary at St. Petersburg end Constanti
nople.

He refused these positions, preferring to stay in

Paris and wait for an appointment in Berlin, where he was
nearer th© center of affairs.^8

In 18?6 the appointment

came, and Holstein returned to Berlin, where he remained for
the next thirty years*

It was not long before he was a part

of th© exclusive circle that was the center of Bismarck's
foreign m i n i s t r y * ^

He held the rank of Legationarat?® and

easily won Bismarck's praise as ” 'the faithful Fritz.»n71
At th© Congress of Berlin he served a portion of the meeting
^Rich,

“Arnim Affair,”

pp* Ij.O-Lj.1*

^ H o l s t e i n papers, II, x i .
^7Joachim Kuerenberg, Holstein pie Graue Emlnenz
(Berlins Verlag Helmut Rauschenbusciii T ^ U T T ^ p T 3*7* Here
after cited as Kuerenberg, Emlnenz*
^®Rich, “Arnim Affair,” p. 52.
k^craig, From Bismarck, p. 35*
?0(jooch, Holstein Oracle, p. LjOy*
71lbld*, p. 14-03*
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as a secretary, for which he received a lower grade of th©
French Legion of Honor.

Holstein was even at the side of

Bismarck when he signed the 'Dual Alliance in 1 Q?9.
he advanced to M s

In 1880

highest •cal t! 01?, that of ^ortragender

Rat, Assistant Under-Secretary,72 or 8anlor Connaellor In th©
Political Division of the Foreign Kiri©try.73
The Vortragender Hat enhanced his position, particu
larly during the 1870*s by his continued intimate relation
ship with Bismarck fa family*

Johanna von Biomarek, wife of

the Chancellor, looked upon Holstein with special favor.

She

always provided a cheerful welcome on his various visits and
holidays ©pent at Var*in*7U

Bismarck especially enjoyed the

discussions with Holstein, and Herbert felt he was on© of his
closest friends*

His connections with the family were also

interwoven with his official position*

He, along with Herbert

and Killian, functioned as th© Chancellor1© private secre
tary.

In such capacity they maintained, the link between th©

Chief at Varz-In and th© Foreign Ministry in Berlin.75
By the late 1370*9 Holstein began to withdraw from Hue
intimate social life of th© Bismarck family.

In l8?6 Marie

7?il.td., j.p. L- , -14.07.
73]ioig teln Papers 3 II, xi .

7%v°gge, Lebensbcker. >tinIs. p. xxxv.
Memoirs, II, 126.
^ Holstein Papers^ II, xii.

Baulc-u,
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von Bismarck married

-lio ambitious Count Kuno zxx Rantzau,76

who Joined Holstein and the Chancellor* s sons as personal
secretary at Varzin and Fr10drichsruh•77

Holstein hated

K&ntsau, whom he found offensive as well as

i n c o m p e t e n t

.78

Eventually his hatred caused him to break relations with the
Count, and slowly he decreased the number of M s
the Bismarcks•

visits to

In 1-3% the Tlantzau-Holstein antagonism went

ao far that Holstein dial longed the son-in-law to a duel.
Hantzau refused to accept and the matter ended*79

Holstein’s

social relations with Bismarck’s family almost ceased to ex
ist, but even 30, th© Incident failed to damage his official
or personal relations with Bismarck and Herbert
Holstein, during the late 1370*s and iS80fs, contin
ued to increase his influence and power.

He demanded that

every document and report pass through his hands.

'Tith his

complete knowledge of the Foreign Finistry fil©3 , he always
provided a ready explanation of any negotiation, and gave
freely of his advice as to the wisest p o l i c y . ^

More Impor-

^ D u r l n g the l-370fs there wore strong Indications
that Holstein would marry Marie. Fogge* Lebensbekenntnis,
p. xvii•
77HoIstein Papers, I, 21^.
7Bibid,, XX, 96-98.
79Ibld.. 151-5?.

8oXbld.. X, xtii.
°^Gooch, Hols tain Oracle, p. lill.
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tant was als control and direction of policy through diplo
matic channels*

Bismarck permitted Holst© 5.n, as did the next

three Chancellors# to correspond directly with German diplo
matic representatives, as well as with a number of foreign
contacts•^

Such communications war© not officially filed

b? the foreign Office, nor were they submitted to the Chan
cellor or Foreign Secretary*

Besides obtaining valuable in-

forma ti on through his correspondence# th© Fortragender Fat
communicated, quite unofficially, the German nosit4on on a
pending question or the attitude that he desired a certain
government to believe as reflecting Borman policy,

By such

means ho influenced, if not controlled, the outcome of dip
lomatic

I s s u e s

.^3

in actuality Holstein conducted r» secret

diplomacy, independent and sometimes contrary to the policies
of the four Chancellors under* whom he s e r v e d . O t h e r

offi

cials conducted private correspondence, but it was not so
advantageously employed as was the case with Ho l s t e i n * ^
Intrigue was another means whereby Holstein increased
Op
Holstein lapera# 1, xlx. It was Joseph Chamberlain#
Hermann von Sckar^ste In, Alfred Rothschild, and the Duk© of
Devonshire, the so-called foreign contact?* who conducted the
sporadic negotiations lor an Anglo-German alliance from IB98
to 1901* fhls type of diplomacy led to the problems and dis
crepancies of the alliance talks.
^3ibl.rt*, III, ix-x.
*%Gooch# Holstein Oracle, p. hii9.
^ H o l s t e i n Papers, III# ix-xi•
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his power and multiplied his Influence.^
nature and personal likes m d

His suspicious

dislikes led him to remove in

dividuals from both high and low positions*^7

Th© fact that

he possessed such a great amount of compromising knowledge
merely intensified his passion for intriguing against those
he felt were incompetent or who offended h i m * I n

many in

stances Holstein sacrificed the proper execution of foreign
policy In order to avenge *hat he construed as constituting
Oq
an insult* ~ Intrigue, however, was not particular to Hol
stein.

Bismarck made use of it and quite effectively in

conducting the affairs of the Second Reich.90
In spite of his intrigue and special privileges, Hol
stein supported and worked for the implementation of the Bis
marck ian

s y s t e m .

91

Since the creation of the Second Reich In

I 87O, Bismarck worked for an enduring European peace based on
BE
^Johannes Haller, Philip Eulenburg: The Kaiser*s
Friend, trane* Ethel Colburn Eayn© (2 volsV; How York: ATfre<f A. Knopf, 1930).
Hereafter cited as Haller, Eulenburg*
Haller argued most effectively in support of Holstein*s in
triguing nature*
In fact Holstein implicated himself In The
Holstein Papers which read like a scandal sheet of BismarckTan and Wilhelm!an Germany*
8?Qtto Haramann, The World Policy of Germany 18901912, brans. Maud© A* Huttman (Sew York: Alfred A 7 Knopf,
l927), p. 171• Hereafter cited as Hammann, World Policy.
8% 00 eh, Holstein Oracle, pp. Lj.lH-15, U53-55*
AO
7Craig, From Bismarck, p. [4O.
90j. Alden Nichols, Germany After Bismarck: The
Caprivl Era l890-lS9li (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1958J , p . 322. Hereafter cited as Nichols, Caprivl.
9^-Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. J413.
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an Intricate system, o.f alliances and alignments.

The geo**

graphic position of Gsrm.ar.ry, with her unnatural defensive
frontiers, required binding alliances to insure any lasting
protection.92

Any form of an alliance with Franc© remained

impossible because of the French desire for ravano.be over the
loss of Alsace-Lorraine.

Bismarck, therefor©, turned to Aus

tria and gained protection of the German rear with the sign
ing of th© Dual Alliance in 1^79*

Th© Chancellor negotiated

th© Triple Alliance in 1391 between Germany, Austria, and
Italy, but the Second Reich still faced the possibility of
war on two fronts.

Germany required, at the very least, th©

assurance

ofRussian neutrality, which appeared impossible

to obtain

in light of 'Russian and Austrian antagonism over

th© Balkans.^3

Bismarck felt Germany lacked any particular

interest in the Balkans; therefore, he placed himself as
mediator between Austria and Russia by forming the Dreikaisorbund of 1372. 9ti

The agreement functioned until 1373 when

it collapsed as a result of the near eastern crisis.

Th©

three Emperors revived th© agreement in lBBl, only to have
92Wllliam L. Longer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism
1090-1902 (2 vols.; Hew Yo rk 5Si fr e d A • fenop f ,"*I"935)
IT *
Hereafter cited an Larger, Diplomacy.
93(>, v , Gooch, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft
(Hew Yorks
Longmans, Green and Co. , I%"2 ), p. 617 Here-.
after cited as Gooch, Studies.
^ R a y m o n d J. Sontag, European Diplomatic History
The Century Co., 1933), P P * 6-9.
1671-1932 (New Yorks
Hereafter cltod as Sontag, European Diplomatic.
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It again collapse In 1887.

Bismarck then negotiated the se

cret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and supported the Medi
terranean Agreement between Italy, Austria, and Britain.
Peace resulted as long as Bismarck refrained from favoring
Russia or Austria more than the other, and as long as Brit
ain continued antagonistic toward Bus si a and fri ©ndlv to the
Tplola Alliance.

Success depended noon how well Bismarck

manipulated the alliances and the real or unreal ententes.9$
In 1335 Holstein horan to disagree with Bismarck*s
policy.

He opposed Bismarck and his son, Herbert, who be

came State Secretary In 1385, on personal grounds.

Holstein

hated the domineering manner typical of th© family and more
specifically the unorthodox manner In which Herbert ran th©
‘horeign

O f f i c e .

96

xn the area of foreign policy, he opnosed

Herbert’s pro-Russian tendencies, with Which th© Chancellor
increasingly seemed to a g r e e .

More incomprehensible was t h ©

pu rpos© b eh ir.d Bi srnarck *s e ver Inc r aa & !n g ays tam of s.1liancea
and treaties.

As far as Holstein discerned th© Chancellor

endangered the existence of the 'Triple Alliance by inces
santly

vacillating between Russia, Austria, Britain, and even

F r a n c e . 9?

Germany appeared to lack a consistent policy or

9^tiang.er, Diplomacy, II, fy.59-60.
96o-ooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 110.
II, 272-73.
9 7 l b l d . , T, xii!, II, xiv-xv.

Holstein Papers,

any reliable allies, who would promise support in case of
war.^
Holstein first began to inaugurate an Independent
foreign policy over the proposed marriage of the Prince of
Bulgaria.*^

In I88I4 the pro-British Grown Princess Victoria,

daughter of Queen Victoria, began a campaign to marry her
second daughter to the anti-Russian Prince of Bulgaria, Alex
ander von Battenberg.

Bismarck had no Intention of antago

nizing Russia for the sake of a royal marriage*

Such an act

Implied German support for Prince Alexander1s plans to halt
the Russian design of extending her influence in Bulgaria.
Holstein worked against the aggressive advances of Russia
and simultaneously attempted to gain the support of the fu
ture Kaiser, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, for the contin
ued existence of Bismarck as Chancellor*

He hoped to achieve

his two objectives by encouraging th© support of the Batten
berg marriage in Vienna and London by means of his corre
spondence with the German ambassadors*

In Berlin he attempt

ed to gain support by Intriguing with Count Hugo von Radollnskl, th© Crown P r i n c e ^ Court Chamberlain*

Radolinskl

proposed that Herbert should condone the marriage, thereby
winning the favor of the Crown Prince.
that went too far.

Holstein remarked

The Chancellor would never voluntarily

" i b i d ., II, xlll.
"ibid.. I, xlll.
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accept the possibility of such a fait accompli♦

His propos

al would only alienate the Grown Prince and Bismarck, which
must ha avoided if the Chancellor was to continue at his post
under the new Kaiser

Holstein stated:

”1 have some

times gone beyond the intentions of the Big Capo, have occa
sionally even used my ways In reaching his goals.

But I

have never consciously gone directly counter to his inten
tions

He believed that some other way must be devised

to oppose the pro-Russian policy.
The Rattenberg marriage failed to occur, but Holstein
continued to oppose Bismarck*s pro-Hussian policy.

From

l q36 to 1390 Holstein worked constantly with Paul von Hatzfaldt, his life-long friend and Ambassador to Great Britain,
attempting to bring Germany and Britain closer to ether.
They bell evecl that Anglo-German friendship would create a
counterweight to the Chancellor?s pro-Hussianism. 1°3

Hoi-

stein felt absolutely that
wo cannot let Austria be destroyed by Russia because we
should then stand helpless between Russia and France5
but that if we hinder Russian designs on Austria we must
as a result; be prepared to face her hostility Instead of
100Ibld., II, xv-xvii•
101Ibld., XII, 192.
102Ibld. , II, xvil.
103lbld., xlv, xvi•
For""a detailed account of Holstein* 3 independent
policy with Hatzfeldt see Helmuth Krausnick, Holatelns
Geheimpolltlk in der Ara Bismarck, 1666-1890 (Hamburg: 19i|l).
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flattering her in a way that disheartens the other
Powers— ingland as ell as Austria — and increases Rus
sian arrogance *1^
Both Holstein and Hatzfeldt failed to comprehend the
purpose behind German policy*

The Chancellor moved toward

Russia to win the Czar’s friendship, thereby the Deace of
Europe.

If forced to a decision, Germany must always side

with Austria over Russia, geographic position demanded It as
did the French desire for revanche.^®^

Holstein would never

have misconstrued th© Chancellor1® policy if Bismarck had
kept his subordinates informed as to the purpose of his ac-

.

ti 0113 1 0 6
The pro-Russian policy led to the negotiation of the
Reinsurance Treaty.

Signed in 188?, Germany assured Russia

of support In th© Balkans and benevolent neutrality in case
Russia had to defend

C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . ^87

Holstein exerted

his limited Influence against the concluding of the Treaty
but without success.

He definitely felt It contradicted the

^ ^^Holstein Papers, II, 328.
^ ^ Jlbiu.., xiv-xv.
Alfred Francis Pribram, England and oh© Inter-*
nation al Policy of the European Great Powers 137T-1yllt TOxToraT" au^riirc 1
5
7
^
7
pv7^rw&r~Tieveafter cited as Pribram, England and Europe.
^ ^ B olstein I'apera, I, xiii•
IQ^iUrold Temper ley and Lillian M, Pon son (ed* ),
Foundations of Brlfcish P'oreny; Policy from Pitt (1792) to
Sail abur y (lffiOlT ~olF"Doc\men ta Old and New (Cambridge s
tHe Univers 1ty Press! 1 ^38'), 'pTTSfy'•"""" Hereafter cited as
Temperley, Foundations.
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Triple Alliance and constituted a major mistake by Bismarck,
but he supported and helped conclude th© Mediterranean Agree
ment with Britain in the same y e a r . ^ ®

The latter provided

that Great Britain, Italy, and Austria should maintain th©
status quo in the Mediterranean*

At least the Russian ad

vances received a partial counterweight in the tenuous Brit
ish agreement *109
During the last three years of Bismarckian rule,
Holstein persisted in violently criticizing th© Chancellor's
foreign p o l i c y * ^ ®

Ho matter how much he criticized, he

acted on the basis of what he understood as the best inter
ests of the Peleh*

His patriotism cannot he doubted. HI-

Holstein "loved Prussia, loved the German HeIeh like a mother
and like a b r i d e * W h a t e v e r
felt he was justified*

actions Holstein took, h©

The object was the welfare of Duets eh-

land.113
The death of Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm in 1888
brought to the throne the immature and vain Kaiser
lO^Holsteln Paper®# X, 127* II, xii-xv.
on tag, European Diplomatic* op. .1,1-1+2*
^^ H o l s t e i n Papers, IT, xv*
UlTrotha, Holstein als Hens eh, pp. xvii, xv.
TIP
"■^Maximilian Harden, Koepfe (ip vols.; Berlin:
lag Erick Reiss, 1910), I, 130-31• Hereafter cited as
Harden, Koepfe*
^^■^Trctha, Holstein als Fensch, p. 96.
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Wilhelm 1 1 . ^ ^

The personality of the new Kaiser Indicated

that a conflict was inevitable with Bismarck over who was to
control Germany*

In 1890 the fatal crash came, and Wilhelm IT

dismissed Bismarck as German Chan cell or . ^ 5

Holstein real

ized that the Kaiser was the more powerful; therefore, he
remained at his post instead of resigning with the Chancellor
and his f o l l o w e r s B o t h Herbert and Bismarck expressed
surprise when they learned that Holstein planned to remain,
but they suffered a greater shock when they learned that th©
Vortragender Rat worked against the renewal of the expiring
Reinsurance Treaty.
With Bismarck's dismissal there existed little oppor
tunity of renewing the treaty.

In the Foreign Office only

Holstein remained fully aware of the nature and history of the
treaty, and he opposed it.^-®

At th© basis of Holstein *s arguments

lll+Brlch Eyck, "Holstein as Bismarck's Critic,”
Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in honour of
G ♦ 'P * (fooch, C. S ., ed. Arshag Shann er Sarkiasion^Bon^on:
Longmans, 196Y), pp. 263-61+. Hereafter cited as Eyck, "Bis
marck 1s Critic."
■^Sjjichols, Caprivi, pp. 13-11+.
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SOme controversey over whether or not
Holstein was directly Involved in any intrigue to cause the
fall of Bismarck, but apparently Holstein was cleared from
any direct involvement.
See Ibid., pp. 263-65•
■^

> T h e r a

w

a

s

^^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. 1+15-18*
^ ^ L a n g e r , Diplomacy, I, 3-5•
There is a great deal of controversey over whether
or not th© Reinsurance Treaty was Inconsistent with th© Triple
Alliance, and if the failure to renew led to the FrancoRuss lan Alliance.
Supposedly th© German-RussIan split began

26
against renewal and of his foreign policy was the mainte
nance of the Austrian alliance and the benevolent neutrality
of Great Sri tain

The Reinsurance Treaty violated both

these principles.

By supporting Russia in the Balkans Ger

many antagonized the British and contradicted its obligations
to Austria under the terms of the Triple Alliance.
he felt, possessed control of German policy.

Russia,

The Russians

forced Germany to follow their dictates by threatening to
reveal the secret treaty to Vienna.

Once the Austrians dis

covered the nature of th© agreement, they would drop th©
Triple Alliance, and no power in Europe would trust Gerrnan y.l20

Holstein's arguments convinced the new Chancellor,

Count Leo von Caprivl, and the Kaiser not to renew th©
treaty,3*21
stein, ^22

Bismarcks were furious and never forgave Hol
but by that time the opinion of th© Bismarck fam

ily was of less significance.

Th© dismissal of the first

at the Congress of Berlin, when Bismarck failed to recognize
and support th© claims of Russia, not 5n 1090.
Also the Med
iterranean Agreement seemingly made the Reinsurance Treaty
non-operative.
If the Reinsurance Treaty was ineffective by
1890, the strong criticism against Holstein for having used
his influence in seeing that the Treaty lapsed would apnear
as being somewhat unjustified.
See Temperley, Foundations,
pp. I+5U~55» and Herbert Henry Asquith. The Genesis of tfaeTwar
(New Yorks
George H. Doran Co., 1923), pp. 27-2& Here after
cited as Asquith, Genesis.
^•^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. i+18-20, 510.
^•^Holstein Papers, I, 127-31.
^2^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. 1+18-20.
I£?2?HoIgtein Pagers, X, 131-32
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Chancellor and the lapsing of the Reinsurance Treaty ended
Blemaroklan rule and inaugurated the sixteen year period
known as the "Holstein Era, " ^ 3

*^?Eyek, "Bismarck's Critic," p# 265

CHAPTER II
FRIEDRICH VOR KOLSTIEN AND GERMANY 1890-1901
After 1390, Holstein exerted his greatest Influence
on th© direction of German foreign* policy.^

His power had

suffered under th© limitations established by Bismarck, but
following the old Chancellor *s dismissal, Holstein became an
active formulator of policy.3

The Yortragender Rat, as the

most competent official held over from Bis m a r c k ^ adminis
tration,^ provided th© knowledge necessary to conduct the
affairs of the German Foreign Office and insured the conti
nuity of the traditions of German foreign policy.3?

Chancel-

*Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. Lj20.
^Hermann Frelherra von Eckardstein, Lebens-Erlnnerungen u. Polltlache Denkwurdigk e 11 en von Botschaftsrat (3 vois.;
Leipzig:
Paul Llst"i 1919-21), 'l, 12-16•
Hereafter cited as
Eckardstein, Er1nnerungen. Johannes Haller, Philip Eulenb u r g s Th© Kaiser *a Fri end, trans • Ethel Colburn"W ayn« T 5
voIs•; New Y o r k : Alfred A • Knopf, 1930).
Hereafter cited
as Haller, Bulenburg. Both Eckardstein and Eulenburg argued
that after 1890 Holstein possessed nearly absolute control
of policy and, at the very least, his direction was In pre
ponderance.
They also felt his influence was more negative
than positive.
^Holateln Papers. Ill, xl.
4-Erlch Brandenburg, From Blamarck to the World W a r »
trans. Annie Elizabeth A dams (ton cion : £Txford llnIvarsi ty
Press, 1927)# p. 23* Hereafter cited as Brandenburg, From
Bismarck World.
5$ooch, Holstein Oracle, p. ij.26.
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lor Gaprivi and the new State Secretary, Adolf Hermann Marschall, lacked any extensive knowledge of foreign affairs and
were forced by circumstances to depend upon Holstein for ad
vice and g u i d a n c e T h e

three Chancellors, who followed

Bismarck, depended not only upon Holsteinfs knowledge and ex
perience, but, much more significantly, they relied upon his
Ideas and guiding p r i n c i p l e s T h o u g h he lacked breadth and
a
flexibility in his judgments,■ his superiors always consulted
him on important questions of policy before final action.^
Holstein, by drafting and revising memoranda,

influenced and

advised officials ranging from German ministers and ambassa
dors to th© Chancellor and even the Kaiser as to questions
of foreign policy.**-*

His varied personal contacts, his quick

apprehension, and his cunning** made Holstein indispensable
to the German Foreign Office.*^
Holstein, though he exercised considerable power, al
ways felt that his influence was extremely limited.

His pow-

^Gooch, Studies, p. I30.
?Ho1btein Papers, ITT, x:t •
^Raymond James Son bag, Germany and England, Background
of Conflict l8fj.S-l691i (New York!
D. Appleton Century, Co.,
r ?3 8 ), p • 308. Here a fter cited as Sontap, Germany and England.
^Haller, Kulenburr,, TI, Apoendlx I, 298.
IQibld.. 297.
11,
'Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. Ijljfl.
12►Craig, From Bismarck, p. 38.
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©r, h© said, mainly consisted of correcting, guiding, and
restraining policies previously inaugurated.

He believed he

had very little opportur ?tj to Initiate any independent ac
tion and was far from the director of German foreign r alley, *3
Whether Holstein was correct or not, he employed various
means for maintaining M s

position in the government.

This

was best exemplified by bis estrangement from Bismarck and
insane fear of the old Chancellor’s return to p o w e r . ^

Hol

stein had won the antipathy of Bismarck when he had remained
in the Foreign Office following the old Chancellor’s dismiss
al and when he had failed to gain renewal of the Reinsurance
Treaty.^

Holstein reasoned that if Bismarck ever returned,

h© would immediately lose his post and power .^

His appre

hension was r e a l , b u t ho still employed the t h r e a t ^ of
l'3narry F. Young, Maximilian Harden, Censor Germania©
(The Hague: Mertinue Hijhoff, l^fj’JT,pp. 85*8% fferea’f ter
cited as Young, Harden.
^ H aller, I-ixlonburg, 1 , 28k.
^ Holstein Pap erg, ITT, 333*37.
^^Gocch, Holstein Oracle, pp. h? 6-27.
17Faller,* Fuicnbnrg,
■
.... itn,,3 T,* ?3k.
1893^4- Holstein, went almost Insane with fear that
th© Bismarcks would return when th© comic journal Kladderdeutsoh ran a series of articles satirizing HolsteTn" ‘ahS two
otherForeign officials as being the motivators of German pol
icy. Holstein always despised to be in the public eye and
was positive that Bismarck was behind the articles, since th©
old Chancellor was the only person who hated bin so violent
ly. He was so taken with fear that he challenged Herbert to
a duel which rover took place.
Gooch, Holstein Oracle,
pp, 1427-29.
Kuerenberg, Rmlnenz, p p . It£-1 7 ,
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Bismarck1s return as a reason for submitting his resignation.
Holstein would only consent to withdraw his resignation if
the government adopted an antl-Bismarckian attitude or com
plied with his views on policy.

The Chancellors, except in

1906 when Holstein fs resignation was unexpectedly accepted,
complied with his demands since the Foreign Office xfas too
dependent upon the Vortragender Hat to even consider his re
signing.

The result was that Holstein remained an influen

tial force in the direction of p o l i c y . ^
After Bismarck resigned, Holstein was expected to
obtain a higher position in the German Foreign Office.

He

was asked to succeed Herbert Bismarck ae State Secretary but
refused on the basis that he was unqualified to perform, the
parliamentary and social duties required of the post.2 ^
stein never deni red to appear In the public eye,

Hol

and felt

he could best serve the Belch by remaining an Tindcr-Secre
pp
fcary*
His aversion to public and special distinction was
so strong that not until I89B was he willing to accept the
title of Flrklicher Oehrimrat and Fxcollercy.^

Title and

rank meant very 1 ?tile to him as he derived satisfaction from
l^Holstein Papers, I, xv.
PP. f1.3 2 - 33 "
20Ibid., p. hi?.

Gooch, Holstein Oracle,
21Ibid., p. ’.hO.

2 -Troths, Holstein als Fensch, p. 73*
23cooch, Kolstein Oracle, p. h
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involvement In the important work of the German Foreign Of
fice.^

From 1090 until his death in 1909 Holstein’s domi

nant concern was with the direction of Gerr an foreign pollay.25

In I8O.J4. Bismarck had inaugurated the Imperialistic
policy of Feltpolitik,

The Chancellor had reluctantly en

tered the colonial race and he had always maintained that
Germany was first a continental r o w e r N e v e r t h e l e s s #

Ger

many# during the later years* of FI smarckiar control, became
increasingly engrossed with obtaining territory in Asia and
Africa•^

Bismarck and his successors realised that the suc

cess of German colonial expansion depended noon the willing
ness of Britain to condone Germany’s imperialistic desires.^®
They also perceived that British support would maintain peace
and guarantee German security In

E u r o p e *29

No one realized

this more than Bismarck and Holstein*30
'During 1889 Bismarck had hoped to gain Great Brit
a i n ’s support by offering her a defensive alliance.
2% l o h ,

The

" A w I b Affair," p. 3fJ.

2^Goooh, Holstein Oracle, pp.

li20-2f.

^Pribram, Fn gland and Fur ope,» pp* 29-30,
2?La«ger, Diplomacy# I, h-5,

II# 7°-*, ?9?.

^Pribram, England and Europe, pp, 2°-31*
^Brandenburg, From Bismarck world, pp. 33-3h«
3®Trotha, Holstein air T-rnsch, p# xix#

British had rejected the
the need of (reman support,

31 though they had realized
Britain always felt that an

alliance was not mandatory to the .maintenance of peace and
the success of her struggle with Russia in the Far Fast and
France in Africa#

Both Germany and Britain needed the sup

port of the other, but

the British felt they needed it less32

since isolation and naval rower still had its merits*

Nev

ertheless, the question of the success or failure of AngloGerman co-ooeratlon dominated European diplomatic affairs
between 1990 and the outbreak of World War 1.33
In 1B90 Germany’s refusal to renew the Reinsurance
Treaty emphas ized her need of British friendship.

Oanrivi,

the Kaiser, and Holstain3^ rec o g n i zed the truth of Bismarck’s
comment that Germany1a proper relation with Britain was one
of "traditional f r i e n d s h i p . Caprlvi and h i s successors
duly sought British support to strengthen the Triple Aliiance.y°

British policy was to support those powers with whom
3

ontag, Europe an PI •plo'matto , p. hf».

30

‘■Herbert Perris, Gf3marry and the German Emperor (New
York:
Henry Holst and Co.," t9l2), p.TJSb*
Hereafter cited
a F e r r i c , Gorman Emperor.
33gf-ooch, Holstein Oracle, p. h.HH*
3^!Iq 1 stein Papers, TTT , 171.
35yd. r Becker, Fuerst Buelow urtd England 1997-1909
(Greifswatd, 1929), p. 57* Her after cited as Becker, Fuerst
Buelow*
3^Lady Gwendun Cecil, Life of Robert, Fargo is of
Salisbury (I4. vols.; Londons Hodder and Stoughton, I§2T~32),
i'V, 36^-06# Hereafter cited as Cecil, Salisbury*

she had least to quax»rel*

In 1390 the British had no dis

pute vrith the Triple Alliance 3? and agreed to conclude a numher of colonial agractionts with G e r m a n y * O n

this basis

Anglo-German relations appeared satisfactory though the two
governments were not without disagreement*

.Distrust and ill-

feeling developed from an inability to agree on terms of co
lonial agreements*

The Germans believed that .Britain’s re

fusal to grant greater colonial concessions resulted from
iior desire to impede German ambitions i or a colonial empire.39
German dissatisfaction with Britain over colonial
affairs drove her in 1394 to attempt to regain Russia’s
friandahip•

The Germans had difficulties in regaining

R u ssia’s support as the Russians had moved closer to Prance
since 1390*

Russia had sought French support since the fail

ure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty and the growth of AngloGerman friendship*

The result of the Pranco-Hussian friend

ship was the conclusion of the Dual Alliance of X39!i * ^
Prance, no longer isolated, possessed an unwilling ally in
Russia and once again threatened GermanyTs wostern border*
‘Viscount urey of F&lioden, Twenty-FIve Years Xo921916 (2 v~ols•; London: Frederick A. Stoke s Co., W32'T, 1,
7-b, Hereafter cited as G r e y , Twenty-Flve*
J ifribrum, Rn;;Iund and Purope* pp. IjB, >2 *
^o
Brandenburg, From Bismarck sorid, p* g0 •
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Japanese and the British, who maintained cordial relations
with Japan, and failed to weaken the Dual A l l i a n c e . ^
German foreign policy indicated by 1

that Germany

had failed to win British friendship, isolate France, or ob
tain any real hop® of Russian friendship.^-®

Much of th© re

sponsibility for th® German failure resulted from th© inter
ference of the Kaiser in foreign affairs and the lack of co
ordination between the four major instigators of policy--the
Kaiser, th© Chancellor, th© State Secretary, and Holstein
Ho individual was more aware of this fact than Holstein who
placed the blame on the meddling Kaiser.
Holstein supported the Kaiser during the early years
of his reign and hoped that Wilhelm II would restrain th©
power of the Bismarcks•

Th© Vortragender Rat was soon dis

appointed and became on© of the Kaiser*s most violent crit
ics.^

He condemned Wilhelm II for interfering in foreign

affairs, inaugurating policies contrary to those in existence,
and not informing the German Foreign Office of any policy
change.^

Th© impulsiveness of the Kaiser and his indiscre-

^Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, pp. 69-71.
Wlbid.
^ % o p p e l S. Pinson, Modern Germany (Hew York:
Th©
Macmillan Co., 195U), PP« 302-3$3. Hereafter cited as Pinson,
Modern♦
^ C r a i g , From Bismarck, p. 37*
^ Holstein Papers, II, xvii-xix.

^ I b i d ., III,

612.
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fcions in private conversations, as well as emotional speeches,
only damaged the position of the Reicbr^

by creating feel

ings of suspicion and distrust among the European p o w e r s * ^
Holstein stated, "The Kaiser is a conceited child; he is not
within th© realm of r e a l i t y " ^ and
the chief danger in th© life of Kaiser Wilhelm II is that
he Is and remains absolutely unconscious of the effect
which his speeches and actions have upon Princes, public
men, and the masses*
The life work of ©very Government
of Wilhelm IX must be to counter this danger and as far
as possible to nullify these effects* A task which soon
wears one out*>6
Holstein attempted to curb th© interference of th©
Kaiser and to rectify the lack of unity in foreign a f f a i r s ^
by forming a number of friendships with individuals from
whom Wilhelm accepted a d v i c e * ^

Through such friends, Hol

stein discovered the attitude of the Kaiser on important
diplomatic questions and hoped by advising these intermedi
aries, who in turn advised th© Kaiser, to win acceptance of
Foreign Office policies*

The first such intermediary was

Count von Waldersee who was followed by th© more important
Count Philip Eulenburg, "the Kaiser*s Friend*w

Eulenburg

enjoyed the confidence of Wilhelm II for most of the 1890*s
53lbide, I# 190*

^ H o l s t e i n Papers, III, 612-13*
^ C r a i g , From Bismarck, p* 37*
^Ha l l e r , Eulenburg, I, 230-91.
5 9Ibld*, 280-82, 307-310.

b i d *, IV, 200.

38
and was replaced by Count von Buelow in 1897, when the lat
ter became State Secretary.
During the middle 1890*e Holstein became more con
cerned about the increasing interference of the Kaiser and
Initiated new methods for limiting Vilhelm's a c t i o n s . ^

Hol

stein favored strengthening the position of the Chancellor
in opposition to the Kaiser, but Eulenburg continued to favor
curbing the powers of Wilhelm II by Indirect advising.

In

opposition to Eulenburg the Vortragender Hat directed Hohenlohe to take a strong stand against th© Kaiser hoping that
such action would create a balance of power between th©
Chancellor and fcilhelm II.

Holstein's plan failed, and the

Kaiser continued to disrupt foreign affairs,82 particularly
Anglo-German relations. 63
He

years 1890 to 189U marked the highpoint in Anglo-

German friendship,8!j. but succeeding events and th© actions of
the Kaiser caused constant tension and mistrust between the
60Ibid., IT, 83.
^P b i c L
It was this difference of opinion on the
part of Eulenburg and Holstein that eventually led to the
dissolving of their friendship In 1899.
6% b i d ., I, 310-11, 31 <5, 337-38, 3U5-U6.
Papers , ITfV I»32n • 1.

Holstein

^3banger, Pi plomacy, I, 210.
^ G . P. Gooch, History of M o d e m Europe 1873-1919
(New York: Henry Holt and "cm\T93i(T; p. sob: n i ? e a i w
cited as Gooch, History.
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two governments

Though the Kaiser attacked the British

in his violent tirades, he continued to hope that Britain
would join the Triple Alliance or at least consent to an
Anglo-German a l l i a n c e H o

always desired the best of re

lations with the British in spite of his actions to the conA *7
trary. * His
• • • jealousy of Great Britain, her empire, and her
fleet was a cardinal reason both for his being constant
ly attracted to England and for his desiring to become
hor colonial and naval rival•
Th© fact still remained that the Kaiser increased world ten
sions
Holstein criticised the Kaiser for creating, world
tensions, but he agreed with Wilhelm II that an alliance with
Great Britain was for the best Interests of Germany.

Hol

stein felt that in 189U an Anglo-G@rm.an alliance was not im^ L a n g e r , Diplomacy, I, 200, 210.
66
Edvard Frederic Benson, The Kaiser and English Ha
lations (Hew York: Longmans, Green, an 'd Co. ,r"T?3£), p.l^l?•
Hereafter cited as Benson, Kaiser and English.

6?xhia., p. i6o.
^ 'Eugene K. Andevson , 'Eie FIrst Horocoan Crisis 190k1906 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930T, n. §?1.
Hereafter cited as Anderson, First Horocoan.
^^Slle Halevy, A History of the English People in the
Nineteenth Century, Volt W T ~ n iperTaYism an<1 'the Rise o F “
Labour, trans. E. I. Watkin {6 vols•; M e w ’Y o r C : Barnes and
Noble Inc., 1961), V 9 112-13*
Hereafter cited as HaleVy,
Imperialism.

v>
mediately

m a n d a t o r y .

Th© formation of th© Dual Alliance,

which created a counterbalance to the Triple Alliance, had
minimized th© need of Britain to maintain the European bal
ance of power and assured Europe of relative security.

In

these circumstances Germany was able to fellow the policy of
th© "free hand" and, far the time being, was less concerned
with the threat of a European war and free t:o follow an im
perialistic policy.
Holstein perceived little danger in Germany*s policy
of pursuing imperialistic ambitions in Turkey, Africa, and
the Ear East if Germany maintained firm support to the Triple
Alliance and friendly relations with both Britain and Rus7o
sia. fc- In fact lie advocated support of Russia in the Far
East.

Such a policy might gain Russian friendship and em

phasised British isolation, which had increased with the
formation of the Dual Alliance.

Bore important, Holstein

felt, was that when Britain realised, her is ole. t.1on, her
leaders might be more willing to support th© Triple Alliance,
possibly more apt to conclude an Anglo-German alliance, and
^ Friedrich MeIreeke, Herchi cht e d cs Deutscfrrngllschsn Buendnlsproblems 1 89t^»
T § Q l HTMun 1 c h : R • Tldenbourg,
1927)", 'pi °7 . Hereafter cited as Me in© eke, Peg chi cht e .
7^Becker, Fliers t Hue low, pp. 57-50*
^^Gerhard Fitter, FEe te^’inde von der Verschregeeten
BnpJLlachen Freundschaft 1895-1901 TFrelburg i Emil Grosz,
1919! p >"\7* Hereafter cited as ^1tt?'r, tcvcnde.
Hol
stein Papers. Ill, 520, 555-56.
~ ™

la
consent to German demands for colonial concessions in return
for German friendship,"U
By 189)4. Holstein asserted that Germany was no longer
obliged to court the support of th© British, but that Brit
ain was obliged to court the support of the German Empire.
The British, he believed# would eventually recognise their
isolation and seek German support for which Britain would
have to pay In the form of significant colonial, concessions
and by joining the 'Triple Alliance,

intll Britain sought

German assistance, Germany was m e r e l y to wait as the British
must eventually seek Germ.an support.

Germany, In th© mean

time, could make the best of her posltfor hr increasing her
colonial possessions, winning Russia*s friendship, and per
haps bettering relations with France .*^1
Holstein, by December, 189$, realized that Britain
had failed to move any closer to Germany.

He honed to gain

British support by threatening Britain with a Continental
league thereby forcing her to realize the need of German
support#*7^

111© Kaiser had earlier threatened the British

with a Contirsental League, but- the Vontragcnder Rat had de
veloped the idea and first gave it official formula!I or in a
^ B e c k e r , Fuerst Buelow, pp. 57-58.
"^Eugene Fischer, Holsteins Drosses Hein (Berlins
Deubs eh Ye r! agsge sells cha ft7 T925TT p# W"* fierea ft ev n 1.te d
as Fischer, Hein.
7^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. 14.36-37•

!i2

memorandum dated December 3®, 1895*?^

In concise terms Hol

stein argued that Hritain would never solve her differences
with Russia and France.

Since Britain would always refuse

to forsake India without a fight, she would always be opposed
by the Dual Alliance.

Because in India, Britain faced the

threat of Russian advances in Persia and French advances in
Egypt.

Britain1s differences with the Dual Alliance would,

force her to support the Triple Alliance if peace was to
prevail and If Britain hoped to maintain her colonial domi
nance In Africa and the Far East.

The problem was how to

force Britain to perceive her Isolation and dire need of the
support of the Triple Alliance.

Holstein felt that the threat

of a Continental league was the necessary means for pres
suring

the British Into seeking the assistance of

Germany

.77

The Ideas of Holstein on Anglo-German relations con
tained a number of mistaken judgments and fallacies.

His

fundamental fallacy was the unshakeable belief that Britain
would never conclude an agreement with France and Russia.78
7^Langer,

Diplomacy, I, 233*

^7rfaylor, Mastery, p. 366.
Johannes Lepsius,
Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimrne, (eds.),
Die Grosse Folltlk der Europaelachen Kablnette, 1871-191U (UO
voIs * in $ 0 j Ber1i n : Deutsche Veri&gsges©1ischaft, 19221927), XI, 67-69* Hereafter cited as G. P.
E. T. S.
Dugdale (ed.) and trans. German Diplomatic Documents 187119lit (it vols.j Hew Y o r k : Harper and "Bro tHorsT, 19^8-1931),
II, 372-7U* Hereafter cited as Dugdale, German Diplomatic.
7% o l g t e l n Papers, III, it82n. 1.
Policy, p. llil.

Hammann, World

H a t z f e l d t warned Holstein that Britain v e r y p o s s i b l y could

work out an agreement wi t h the .Dual Alliance, but the
T o rtragender Rat failed to heed the A m b a s s a d o r fs a d v i c e * ^

A second fallacy was the idea of coercing Britain into the
Triple Alliance•
pressuring

Instead of gaining support* the policy of

the British backfired, and Germany lout any hope

of Britain *s friendship*
H o l s t e i n ’s hope f o r an alliance was also doomed to

failure because the Kaiser’s i n t e r f e r e n c e in foreign a ffairs
caused Germany to appear to shift her support from first on©
power then to another*

This appearance of vacillation cre

ated oh.ly feelings of mistrust on the part of other powers
and eventually led to G e r m a n y *s i s o l a t i o n * ^
The foreign policy of Lord Salisbury was a nother
factor that prevented an Anglo-German u nderstanding*

Salis

bury distrusted the Germans and hoped to avoid an alii m e ©
with Germany unless there appeared no other m e ans for in

suring British security#®*-

The Irime Minister also possessed

unbounded© onfidence in Britain’s ability to ma i n t a i n her inde7^Gooch,

H o l stei n Oracle,

p. 1;5>7*

®^Pinaoa, Modern Germany, p# 303 #
®*Langer,

IV ,

361.

Diplomacy, I, 2 5 h •

Cecil*

Salisbury,
'

8?
“J# L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain
(3 vols* 5 London * MacmxIIanTan<f Co., 193JJ) , i i ,
Her©**
after cited as Garvin, Chamberlain*
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penderce by relying upon her powerful nsvy.°3

With such

views, Salisbury prevented Britain from joining the Triple
Alliance and frustrated Holstein1s hope for a British alli
ance.^
In addition to the Prime Minister*a opposition the
views of Hohenlohe, Buelow, and the actions of the Kaiser
prevented the conclusion of an Anglo-German understanding.
The two Chancellors, Buelow and Hohenlohe, in opposition to
Holstein and Hstsfeldt, favored better relations with Russia
rather than with Britain.

A British alliance was desirable,

they thought, but not a necessity as Hatzfeldt and Holstein
believed.

Buelow also supported the German naval program,

which only antagonized the British, and refused to curb the
outbursts of the Kaiser or M s

interference In foreign

affairs.
The actions of the Kaiser particularly prevented a
British alliance and resulted in unnecessary damage to AngloGerman relations.

He caused significant damage In 1895

^ C e c i l , Salisbury, IV, 87-8 8.
Lillian M. Penson,
"The Hew Course In British Foreign Policy 1892-1902,” Trans
actions of the Royal Historical Society (London: Office of
Royal HisTorical Soclety, 191^3) XXV, fourth series, 12^-25.
Hereafter cited as Penson, "British Foreign Policy” •
^•Sontag, European Diplomatic, p. 61.
Diplomacy, II, 791.

Langer,

^Bu e l o w , Memoirs, I, 55-56.
Prince Bernhard
von Buelow, Imperial" Sermany, trans. Marie A. Lewenz (Hew
Yorks
Dodd Mead and Co.,~T9lit), pp. 57-58. Hereafter cited
as Buelow, Imperial Germany.
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during his visit to Great Britain.

The Kaiser, while In

Britain, had several discussions with Lord Salisbury at Cowes.
During; these discussions a personal antagonism developed be 
tween the two leaders from a misunderstanding over when one
of their meetings was to occur.

The antagor.1sm of Salisbury

and the Kaiser created distrust between the t\^ro countries
and disturbed Anglo-German relations until the Prime Minister
resigned in 1902.86
Kaiser Wilhelm II caused unrepairable damage to
Anglo-German'relations when he despatched the Kruger telelf.3

gra m .u t

In 1R96 the Jameson raid on the Boer Republics led

the Kaiser to send a telegram congratulateng the President
of the Boer Republics, Paul Kruger, on the Boers defense of
their country from invasion.

The Kaiser and the German pub

lic believed uhat the raid was authorized by the British
government and constituted an act of aggression.

Britain was

furious over the telegram and asserted that Wilhelm

II

had

Interfered in the internal affairs of the British Empire.
The incident caused such antagonism that both Britain and
Germany were never able to restore their previous state of
good relations.^8
^Brandenburg, Prom Biamarck World, pp. 73-76.
H o lstein P a p e r s , IV,

12?-?3*

8 7B r a n d e n b u r g , From Bi s m a r c k W o r l d , p. 85.
86Langer, Diplomacy. I, 22-30, 233-38, 25k.
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Following the Kruger Incident,Holstein believed that
the problem facing; German foreign policy was how to regain
Britain1s lost friendship and ultimately obtain an AngloGerman

a l l i a n c e .

89

Holstein and the German Foreign Office

realized that the threat of a Continental league was inef
fective in winning British f r i e n d s h i p . T h e Germans, there
fore, modified their antagonistic policy toward the British
by refraining from any unfriendly action until the effects
of the Kruger telegram had passed.

They even made an attempt

to win Britain’s friendship by adhering to benevolent neu
trality In South Africa and Egypt*

‘
T hough German policy

succeeded in obtaining British support, much of Britain *3
friendship was lost or at least limited by Germany1s support
of Russia in the Far E a s t . 91
After the Sino-Japanese Mar, the Far Eastern question
dominated international relations as China, instead of Turkey,
became the "slck-msn" of the world.^2

In 1897 the Germans

took the initiative in the threatened partition of China by
concluding a confusing agreement with Russia.

Germany, in

return for her support of Russia in th© Far East, obtained a
^ Holstein Papers, IV, 22.
9°Ibid., 35-36, 37, lil, 22-21*., 6Uii, 659. Holstein
expressed his support for a greater consideration of th©
British In letters on the above pages.
9lLanger, Diplomacy, I, 282-8 3, 297.
Morocco, pp. 56-57.
92<j*ayior, Mastery, p. 391.

Anderson, First

kl
coaling station at Riau-Chow.
cupying Port Arthur*^3

The Russians followed by oc

These ©vents emphasized Britain’s

Isolationist position, and led Salisbury In 1898, in order
to protect British Far Eastern interests, to enter negotia
tions with Russia to hinder further partition of China*

The

Russians refused Salisbury’s suggestion having no reason to
conclude an agreement that restricted Russia’s Imperialistic
alms in the Far Sast.^fwas working.

It appeared that Holstein’s policy

Germany gained concessions in the Far East

and R u ssia’s friendship, while Britain became more aware of
her isolation.

Holstein believed that if Germany continued

to adhere to the "free hand", Britain would eventually seek
German assistance.^5
The British, though they sought the support of Russia
in 1898, adhered to the strong belief that Isolation was not
as great a threat as was asserted by th© Germans.96

Salis

bury believed that British isolation was a possibility but
was not a fact in 1898 or as long as he was Prime M i n i s t e r . ^
^Brandenburg, Prom Bismarck World, p. 101-102.
^Temperley, Foundations, pp. 1499-5 00.
German Diplomatic, iif; ao-.----^ H o l s t e i n Papers, IV, 10.

U99.
96l b l d . . 791.
97Cecll, Salisbury, IV, 85-86.

Langer,

Dugdale,
Diplomacy, II,

If Britain maintained a strong navy9 8 and worked to preserve
the balance of p o w e r , S a l i s b u r y felt, peace and the best
interests of Britain were possible of atta inmen t.5-®®

Th©

Prim© Minister, in order to avoid isolation and the conclu
sion of an alliance, hoped to obtain th© support of other
powers by concluding limited agreements over specific issues.
He refused to conclude any undefinite, general alliance based
upon future, undeterminable contingencies ♦5-®5- A general
understanding was impossible in light of th© unobtainable
sanction of Parliament and public opinion.5*®^

‘
The Prime

Minister asserted, "the possibilities of the situation must
decide" British policy.5'®3

The result of Salisbury’s policy

was that Britain appeared to vacillate between support to th©
^ Arshag Channer Sarkission (©d.), Studies in Diplo
matic History illa tori ographv in Honour of g T P\ GoocK, C . H.
Dam© Lillian M. Person, ^Obligations fiy*T*r©aty: Their Flace
in British Foreign Policy, IB96-I9H 4.,** (London: Longmans,
1961), p. 8 3 . Hereafter cited as Person, "Obligations"•
®®Gooeh, Studios, p. 62.
l®®John Dean Bickford and Edgar N. Johnson, "The
Contemplated Anglo-German Alliance:
1890-1901," Political
Science Quarterly, XLIT (March, 1927). 22. Hereafter cited
as Johns on, *Con tempi ated" •
5-®1Penson, British Foreign Policy,11 pp. 129-30.
102Cecil, Salisbury, IV, 8 7 .
103l.i Ilian K. Pen son, "The Principles and Methods of
Lord Salisbury’s Foreign Policy," The Cambridge Historical
Journal (19351# V, 10U-105. Hereaftercited as Person,
^Principles11•

1*9

Dual Alliance and th© Triple Alliance.*®^

This wavering of

support caused the other powers to distrust th© British, but
Salisbury’s policy succeeded in preventing Britain from con
cluding a German alliance and avoided upsetting the balance
of power.
Other .members of the British cabinet were more appre
hensive than Salisbury over the position of Britain.5*®^
Chief among these was Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary
and a strong advocate of an alliance with Germany.5-®?

In

1896 Chamberlain and the cabinet ministers, the Duke of
Devonshire and to a lesser degree the nephew of Lord Salisbury,
Arthur Balfour, felt Britain was In eminent danger of Isola
tion and should consider concluding an alii an ce*5-®8

The

British, because of differences with Russia In the Far East
and Franc© In Africa, decided to consider an alliance with
Germany.5-®^
The discussions for an Anglo-German alliance took
1(% b l d .

105Robert W. Seton-Votson , Britain In Inrope 1739-191ii
(Cambridge:
The University Press, 1 5 5 5 ) » PP. 59i*-95. Sereafter cited as Seton-Matson, Britain.
5®®Langer, Diplomacy, IT, 530.
10?Garvin, Chamberlain, III, 251*-55.
*®®Langer,

Diplomacy, II, 193, 1;85-88, 530.

Johannes Preytr, Deutschland und England in ihrer
Polltik und Press© 1m Jahre I‘gQI . (SerltnT Emil "liber5rg,
W W H T r:. 307
Here aft er 'c¥ t © d as Drey or, Dev?tschl an d .

place between March and May, I898 . H ®

The proposed Tinder-

standing was for a. defers ire alliance til th mutual agreement
as to a common policy in China but also in other areas.

Once

the British and Germans had stated the general terms, th©
remaining discussions concerned the arguments for and against
the conclusion of an agreement•5-5,5*
More Important than the detailed discussions was the
manner In which the negotiations were conducted and the in
fluence of the individuals Involved upon th© discussions.
C)
was snd still is a great dispute as to who
exactly inaugurated the alliance talks, th© British in th©
person of Chamberlain or the Germans In the persons of
Bckardsteln and Hatzfeldt.
According to Chamberlain, it was
Eckardstein who first suggested an alliance.
Garvin, Cham
berlain, III, 278-79.
Hatzfeldt attributed the id©a to
Chamberlain• G. P., XIV, Part 1, 202-2014* Pribram stated
that It was of 111;tie significance who offered the alliance
since both states desired some form of an agreement.
Mhrarn,
England and Europe , p. 69. However, It was very important
for "those" "Hi s torian s who felt that if Germany refused a
British offer the German government was at least Indirectly
responsible for not accepting It and possibly avoiding World
War I. Even more important was the real nossibllity that an
alliance was never offered and that what developed Into the
consideration of an alliance was a result of the actions of
an individual not directly connected with either government,
hanger, Diplomacy, II, 531.
Such an individual was the mys
terious PrelKerr Von Eekardstein, who worked behind the back of
and with Hatzfeldt trying to maneuver both governments into
th© concluding of an alliance. As the negotiations from
1898 to 1901 progressed, th© secret diplomacy of Eekardstein
becomes more evident and more condemnable.
For a condem
nation of Eekardstein1s rol© In the 1898 negotiations see
th© significant not© of Balfour in Blanche Elizabeth Campbell
Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour (2 vols.;
New York: G.’ P * Putnam1s Sons,193?)", I, Y87-T9T. Hereafter
cited as Dugdale, Balfour.
5

5
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e

^ ^Langer,

Diplomacy, II, l4.9J4.-96.

Chamberlain served as the leading British negotiator instead
of Salisbury* who was ill in the Sooth of France, or Balfour,
who was acting aa foreign S e c r e t o r y . T h e

Colonial Secre

tary conducted th© negotiations wl th Tiia close friend and
wealthy financier, A M m d

de Rothschild, who desired to pro

tect his Far hasten) interests, and Hermann von Kckardstein,^ 3
an extreme Anglophile and avid supporter of at) alliance•’5*^
Fckardstein, with the support of Rothschild, served as the
intermediary between Chamberlain and -Zlausfeldt, the G e m a n
representative in the alliance negotiabione.

In agreement

with Rothschild and Chamberlain, Fckardstein arranged a
meeting between the Colonial Secretary and Kat&feldb to dis
cuss the possibility of an agreement *^ 5

The discussions

began and throughout their duration Hckarusteln agitated
vehemently for an understanding, so much oo, that he exag
gerated th© desirability of Britain aund Germany for an al
liance ,3-16
11?

Garvin, Chamber!ain, TXT, 2h h .

111
-’Baron Hermann von Eckardstein was not 1n active
diplomatic service of the German Government until 1696 but
was, nevertheless, active in German diplomacy.
In 189& he
was appointed Counsellor of Legation and M r s t Secretary In
the London Embassy be tween 1699-1902. Holstein Papers, IV,
113n. 3*
The Gorman Foreign Office relief unon 'Sctear3sfcein
because of his social connections with the British cabinet.
His wife was the daughter and heiress of the millionaire fur<
nitur© manufacture Sir Blundell Maple, who supplied hokardstein with his social connections and supported M s specula
tion on the stock exchange.
In 1905 following a scandal,
Eckardsteln was divorced.
Buelow, Memoirs, II, Jj.6-1*?.
^^•Garvln, Chamberlain, III, 255-57#
115l b l d ., 2^6-57.

116 Ibld.,

25li-7^.

During th© alliance negotiations Hatzfeldt became
suspicious of Chamberlain *s actions and disliked his forward
business-like manner of conducting diplomatic affairs.
Hatzfeldt*s suspicions were also shared by the directors of
German policy in Berlin. ^ 7

Buelow, who had become State

Secretary in 1397 and near director of German nolicy, was
never enthusiastic about an alliance with. Britain and tended
to accept the advice of Hol s t e i n , ^ ® who, at this time, ad
vocated a policy of listening to the British suggestions but
not to make any definite commitment . ^ 9

Buelow argued against

an alliance since it would antagonize the Russians arid 'hinder
Germany1a imperialistic policy in the Far Fast.

For an al

liance to bo acceptable, he felt, the British Parliament must
approve the measure, which was impossible due to the antag
onism of public opinion.

Present circumstances indicate d that

the best policy was to wait as Britain would eventually re
turn seeking an alliance.

In the meantime Germany was to

continue to express interest in an alliance but only in order
to avoid antagonizing the British.****-®

the policy of th©

"free hand" was still the most profitable and remained Buelow fs
W i w a . , 2*7.
Otto Eammarm, Zur Verges chi cht^ <3es '-eltkrl ere.
(Berlins Feimar bobbing, 1919), p • '/FT Sereaf te"x* "cl ted as
Hammann, Zur Vorg.es chi cht e ♦
H 9B u e l o w , Imperial Germany, p. £3.
120 G. p., XIV, Part 1, 20!;-207, 227-29.
Diplomacy, II ,1|97# p03.

tenser,
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policy during the alliance discussions between 1398 and
1901.121
Hi© Kaiser agreed with Buelow on the alliance ques
tion, even though he had personally pressed Salisbury in
1896 to conclude an alliance.^22

As the Kaiser stated, the

chief concern was for a British alliance that would protect
Germany*s European position and not protect Britain*s inter
ests in th© Far East.

He felt that Germany had no desire to

antagonize the Russians and the French by3*23 concluding an
agreement with Britain.

Germany was not in need of an alli

ance; therefore, Hatzfeldt was to refuse th© offer but to do
so without antagonizing the British.

Th© Ambassador was to

emphasize the hop© for a future British alliance and express
a willingness to conclude minor colonial agreements. 3*2^Th© Kaiser and Buelow also agreed with Holstein,3*2$
who was just as skeptical of Chamberlain's offer.

Holstein

always distrusted the British3*26 arj& felt they desired only
3*23.gecfcer> Puerst Buelow, p. 65.
122por the interesting details of this almost attempt
on the part of the Kaiser to work out an alliance see the
following.
Benson, Kaiser and England, p. 122.
3*23i,anger, Diplomacy, II, 500-501.
121*2* £•» XIV, Part 1, 208-209.
G. P. Gooch,
Before th© W a r , Studies in Diplomacy (2 v ols•; London:
Long
mans, Green and Co., 193&-38), I, 201 • Hereafter cited as
Gooch, Before the M a r .
3*25>B©ckar, Puerst Buelow, p. 270.
^

Holstein Papers, IV, 77.

to involve Germany in conflicts with the Dual Alliance.^27
At the present time, he believed, British support was unnec
essary and would not be needed as long as friendly relations
existed with Russia*

He was also certain that Britain, at

some future time, would conclude an alliance vrith Germany
since Anglo-Russi an antagonism required Britain always to
seek German support.
mate policy.

The "free hand” was still the legiti

He declared, G e r m a n y was and would remain for

a reasonable time the arbiter mundi, that is as long as she
preserved, her independence by not siding with
power.w^28

Germany must continue to work

any other

for the removal of

the small colonial disputes between the two countries-^^ and
simultaneously "preserve the existing desire for friendly
relations for the purpose of a possible later rapprochement. ”3-3$
The British were more eager for an agreement than the
Germans, but they failed to agree on a common policy toward a
German alliance.

The differences

between the British leaders

arose over how far Britain was willing to go in the protec
tion of her Far Eastern interests.^31

chamberlain expressed

a desire, plus an equal amount of eagerness, to conclude

a

binding alliance that proposed to protect

the two nations

colonial and European interests.3*32

so, the unwilling-

127Ibld., 75.
12<?I b l d .. 68-69.

Even

ig&Tbld.. 63n. 1 .
U Oibia.. 7 2 .

13lLanger, .Diplomacy. II, 509-510.
U 2(>arvin, Chamberlain. Ill, 255.
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ness of the Germans and th© refusal of Salisbury to conclude
such an encompassing alliance led Chamberlain to realize
that an agreement was impossible.^33
Salisbury, though he desired to protect Britainfs Far
Eastern interests, believed Britain was strong enough that
she would not have to conclude a German Alliance.^3U

There

was no reason to forsake British freedom of action by binding
herself to Germany.

As Salisbury stated to Hatzfeldt, "You

ask too much for your friendship."

The Prime Minister also

opposed an alliance with Germany because of the manner In
which the Germans and Chamberlain conducted the negotiations.
Salisbury never condoned the alliance discussions even though
Chamberlain kept the Prime Minister informed of the negotia
tions.^^

Bike Balfour, who termed the negotiations "ama

teur," Salisbury expressed little faith in the secret diplo
macy of-*-3& Eckardsteln, Rothschild, and Chamberlain.

He

preferred that all discussion b© conducted through regular
diplomatic

c h a n n e l s .**37

Sine© Salisbury opposed an alliance,

133Ibid., 291, 29H-95.
^Ij-Fribram, England and Europe, p. 70.
Diplomacy,IX. 505-506.

Langes?,

13h b i d . , 51k.
UO.Aigdale, Balfour, I, 189-191.
Balfour gave one of
the most humorous and probably most accurate pictures of th©
diplomacy of th© 1398 alliance negotiations.
It also appeared
that his version was generally the manner in which all th©
alliance talks from 1898 to 1901 were conducted.
1 3?ibid.. 189-190

Chamberlain and Eckardsteln had little hope of coneluding an
agreement•^3®

The Kaiser, before the alliance discussions ended,
committed another one of hia blunders that damaged AngloGerman relations*

Both Germany and Britain stipulated that

the alliance negotiations were to remain secret, but the
Kaiser Informed Czar .Nicholas II that Britain had offered
Germany an alliance*

To the F.aiser *s surprise, the Czar

replied that Britain had offered Russia an alliance in Jan
uary, 1898*

The Incident reaffirmed the danger involved in

Hilheln’s Interference in foreign affairs and Increased Germanyfs distrust of the British.

Britain’s distrust of the

Germans also increased whan she learned that the negotiations
had been revealed to the Russians,^39
In spite of the Kaiser’s blunder, the alliance nego
tiations ended on a positive note*

Both nations expressed a

sincere desire for better relations In the future *

Tho

major task was to remove th© Ill-feeling between the two
governments by solving their colonial disputes*^1^

Such was

predominantly the opinion of the Germans, ’who hoped to gain
1 38lbld.

3-39<}arvir)> Chamberlain, III, 135-69.

Brandenburg,

From Bismarck borid, pp. "IT-IT^ ° T a y l o r , Mastery, 378.

1W-G. P., XIV, Part 1, 209-212.
Diplomatic,~~IlT~, 25.

Dugdale, German

colonial concessions*^*^

Th© British, b«c#u#« they faced th#

threat o t Bussla to th# Far bast* Franc# In th# Faahod* art*
sis* and th# Boer® in fouth Africa *^*3 consented to grant
Q m m i m f colonial ooneastions In return for support,

'Th#

British* therefor®# agreed to negotiate an Anglo-fteman
agreement over the Fortugues# Africtm coltmle®*^1^
In 1398 Portugal faced possible financial collapse*
which raised the question of the disposal of her Afrlcon
colonies.

On O a m a r i y h request Great Britain and Germany

eon eluded an mgr octant in August* 18 98* partitioning th#
Fortuguea#© African oolonles*^1^

Germany* soon after th©

conclusion of the under# banding* bo came dissatisfied with th#
British because they refused be implement the agrecirsent•

Hi#

Frit!rh had failed to enforce the under#bonding because Por*
tugal and Britain had concluded a #caret treaty which trval**
1 dated the agreement with Germany

the manner and clreum-

stance# revolving around the conelusion of the Arglo-Geraon
^ ^ B r a n d e n b u r g * From Bfemarcfc World, pp. 103* 106, 111,
569-70.

lls3ciooch* Studies, p* 61,1*
'

^Mubtd**

569#

banger, Jlplomaey* II*

Brandenburg* Frow* Bt ewarck World*

p# 119.
1^4S i n g e r *

Diplomacy* XI* $?2»2k*

^ ^Ibld.. 619* 621-1:5*

0. ?. Gooch and Harold

Tamper ley* lyltl ah Joomttenta on th# Origin# of the War 1398191k
(11 v ^ T r T o H l S T r ^ a ^ a ^ t F r ^ t m ^ W T i e 5 7
X 9I0 -3 6 )* I* 98-99*
Hereafter cited at j£5. j).

agreement provided only superficial means for bettering the
two governments relations .^-7
Another area for Anglo-German co-operation arose from
difficulties In Samoa.

In 1893 civil war broke out between

native claimants for the Samoan throne,

The 1 stands, at th#

time, were under the administration of Germany, the United
States, and Great Britain.

Th© Germans perceived an oppor

tunity to gain colonial possessions and demanded partition
of the islands.

Salisbury opposed such drastic action and

desired to frustrate the opportunistic demands of the Kaiser.
In st>1 to of Salisbury’s objections an agreement was signed,
hut not before the K a i s e r ’s violent attacks against the Prime
Minister had delayed the negotiations^*®

and unnecessarily

strained the two governments relations. V 9

The» Germans felt

th© Samoan Agreement indicated the ability of the two nations
to co-operate, but in actuality the Pressure and method of
German foreign policy only hindered better relations
In October, 1899, the Boer War broke out and empha
sized Britain’s need of German neutrality.^b^

The British,

^ ^ G o o c h , Holateln Oracle, p. Iy56.
^^Langer,

Diplomacy, II, 620-214..

^^Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, p. 129.
B. D., I, 130.
'
1
•^P^Langor, Diplomacy, II, 62l i•
and Europe, pp. 77-7 0 ,
■^^•Langer, Diplomacy, II, 6214..

Pribram, England
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in order to assure Germany1s friendship* invited the Kaiser
to visit Britain during November* 1399.^*?^

Filhelm II agreed

to the visit not having beer In frlta!n sine© th# dlsasterous
meeting at Cowes in 139?*
Before the Kaiser departed for Britain, he and Fuel dr,
who was to accompany the Emperor* received detnlled instruc
tions from the German Foreign Office as to the policy toward
the British*

The German Foreign Office believed that possi

bly the British, as a result of the Far Be stern and f'outh
African situations* might offer an alliance*

Holstein was

parti©vlarly apprehensive and advi sed that if Chamberlain
p\’rgfstod an arrcement not to act too optimistic*

**u#low

and the Kaiser were only to remind, the British that from th#
present situstion etr©upi»taneee might develop where coo pe rn 11 on won 1d. be u a efrl for both governments #X?lf

As In

t •■'# p# a t , Hoi st#in be!f e vrd,
Germany, now that the art tsti on for revanche bee loot
its immediate political importance, faces no visible
danger of war fror #r»y direction, and world erdenr^r her
peaceful security and make her own position worse if she
undertook to support “tv-lard* whether bv parti clpatl on
in war or by alert neutrality* • • as long as Germany1a
relat* ona vi th Pus si# remain uncharged, ah# will rot
accept an agreement which Is visibly directed against
Fu b s I#.1 "
1

t.'o

*-'c~jtod#raon* First lorooeo* p* 61*
-'•-’hanger*

Diplomacy, IX* 666*

^>U b u #1 o w * Memoirs* 1 * 365-60*
^BPiiolgteln Faper#* IV, lb6-77*
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Holstein*s position and German foreign policy was merely a
repetition of the views held during the alliance negotiations
of 1898
vJhile In Britain, Wilhelm II and Buelow met at Wind
sor with Chamberlain Instead of Salisbury, who was absent
due to the recent death of uls wife-

Chamberlain, as the

British representative In the following alliance discussions,
proposed,l>( probably with some encouragemont from Bekards tein,^^> a defensive alliance directed against Russia be

tween oreat Britain, Germany, and the United Sbates7 ^
Buelow and the Kaiser responded by following Holstein 'a advice^°^ and reaffirmed th© desire for limited agreements over
particular Issues.

Chamberlain was kept friendly so as not

to endanger a future British alliance and the possibility of
gaining colonial concessions.

The alliance negotiations were

unsuccessful, but th© bindsor meetings were a success In
bettering Anglo-German relations and demonstrating to th©
British public Germany's friendship and neutrality in the

^ % o o c h , Studies, p. 6^.
Langsr, Diplomacy. II, 65b-£7.
^>®Baron von SewardstoIn, Ten Tears at the Court of
S t . James 1895-1905 (London:
Thornton Butterwort"S,*l92X),
p. 15T7* Hereafter cited as ''ekardsteln, Ten Years.
3-59 ?ipsir;d ©n be.w , wrom Bismarck World, pp. 137-38.
■^^Bernadotte Schmitt, The Coming of the War 191k
(2 vols •; New York: Charles ScrTPner^T^ons, “1^3^77 1728-29.
Hereafter cited as Schmitt, The Coming.
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Boer W a r . ^ 1
The alliance discussions were far from ended vhen th©
Kaiser had returned to Germany.

Chamberlain, supposedly

under the impression that Buelow and the Kaiser desired an
understanding,162 announced in a sueech at Leicester on No
vember 30, 1899, that the peace of the world depended upon
the "natural alliance” between Britain, Germany, and th©
United States--"© new Triple Alliance.11

Public opinion in

both countries expressed astonishment and condemned the ab
surd Idea.

It was generally felt that the Colonial Secretary

had committed another blunder by continuing to Interfere in
foreign affairs.*^3
Holstein and the German government were just as
shocked as public opinion by Chamberlain1s suggestion and
agreed with Buelow1s views, as expressed in his Reichstag
speech of December 11, 1 '99•^0)4

Buelow, possibly fearing

German Anglophobia end desiring the naasa,^ of the Second
Nava 1 0111, copimonucd on ^ e m a n y 1s f r? en dly reio fcions Trith
1(1b a n k e r ,

Diplomacy. II, 657-58.

l^e’Sarvin, Chamberlain, III, 510-11.
Garvin argued
in his biograuuy of Gh»w;>^pl5Tu shat tho Colonial Secretary
had been led to believe by Buelow that he desired him to
speak nubilely
on the aliiance que??ti on• Thus Chamberlain
vras acting in accord with the wishes of the Gorman govern
ment*
For the opposite view see duelow, Memoirs, I, 370-71•
163Garviu, Chamberlain, TIT, 506-509.
^■^Eckardotein, Ten Year a . p. 11)6.
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Britain.

He made no mention of the Leicester speech*

Cham

berlain was furious and felt Rue low and. the Kaiser had misled
him as to their intentions as expressed at Windsor.

'The in

cident, aa in so many past instances, strained Anglo-German
ralatf ons *
During December, H 9 9 ,

the Bundesrath affair occurred

to mar the relations of Britain and Germany.

The British

had stopped the German mail steamer Bundesrath in an attempt
to halt supplies from going to the Boers.

The Germans were

outraged, particularly the Kaiser who protested, violently*
Eventually, the British released the steamer, and the strain
ii) rel&tlons passed .”°'J
In May, 1900, the problem of the Far Bast returned

to dominate the concern of the world rowers* ^ 7

Groups of

Chinese nationalists, known, ©s Boxers, feared the partition
of China and had rebelled against the f o reigners#^®

The

world powers interpreted the Boxer Rebel11 or as ar indication
of the collapse o f ,China and an opportunity for gaining colo
nial concessions.

The me lor European powers, plus Japan,

Russia, and the United States, on the pretext of protecting
^°^Garvin, Chamberlain, III, G10-11.
IbG
Langer, Diplomacy, II, o60-b2.

167Ibld.. 692.
168Fen~_chon Chang, The Diplomatic Relations Between
China and Germany Since 1898 (Shangha!, Chiral
The Commero T a T ”Pr e ss i 19 3'
6T , p • 6 3 .
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foreign interests and foreigners threatened in the legations
at Peking, agreed to send Count von Waldersee as CommanderIn-Chief of the military forces to crush the Boxer Rebellion,
During the lengthy struggle to suppress the Chinese, the pow
ers soon became aware that Buss!a was primarily interested
in inereaslng her influence in China, particularly In Man
churia.

Even Germany perceived Hussia*s plans a n d attempted

to work more closely with the Bri

t

l

s

h

,

^69

By August, 1900, Russia’s aggressive policy led Ger
many to seek a

Eastern agreement with Britain,

All in

dications pointed to th© conclusion of an agreement since
both governments were on good terms and, to a degree, desired
a formal alliance*

Only Salisbury voiced a skeptical note,

but he eventually agreed to conclude an agreement*

Th.© re

sult was the Yangtze Agreement of October 16, 1900.^>70
The terms of the Yangtze Agreement were confusing,
but th© two countries agreed to maintain the open door in
China, particularly in the Yangtze Valley,

The Germans inter

preted the agreement as applying only to th© Yangtze*

Ger

many* s interpretation limited the effectiveness of th© under
standing for the British, who hoped to employ German support
in halting Russian aggression in ©11 of Chin a .^71

Holstein

agreed with the German interpretation and felt the under**

^ ^Larger, Diplomacy, II, 69lp"95>, 693-700,
^7^ibld,, 700-701,

^71«paylor, Mastery, p, 393*

6k.
standing would better relations with Britair.^72
By the end of 1900 Anglo-German relations indicated
the continuation of closer co-operation between the two gov
ernments*

In Great Britain the Marquis

of Lans&owne, who

had recently become Foreign Secretary, desired the best of
relations with Germany and was more receptive than Salisbury
toward an alliance ,^-73

jrs Germany Buelow had become Chan

cellor in October, 1900,^*7U- and, though he was more proRussian than British, he still favored an alliance with
Britain*^75

At th© same time Oswald von Richthofen had be 

come State Secretary and was easily dominated by the proBritish Holstein.^76

g-j the beginning of 1901 Anglo-German

relations indicated a real prospect of Britain and Germany
concluding an alliance.^77

IT^Hclsteln Papers, IV, 209*
^*73^aXavy, Imperialism, V, 121-22.
X7Uoooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. ii5>2~5>3*
^75 b u ©1 o w , Memoirs, I , 55*
^76(joocXi# Holstein Oracle, pp. lip3-5
^77jjaXevy, Imperial ism, V, 121-22.

CHAPTER Ill
FRIEDRICH VON HOLSTEIN AND THE FIRST PHASE
OF THE 1901 ATTEMPT AT AN ALLIANCE

In January, 1901, relations between Oreat Britain
and Germany were of an except*.onaDyfriendly nature and re
flected hopes felt ir, 'both rations for Increased co-operation#^
The Marquis

of Lans downs, the new British Foreign Secretary,

Buelow, and Richthofen, the German State Secretary, all ex
pressed hope of maintaining and strengthening present re
lations by seme fern of a future alliance#

Responsible par

ties in both countries hoped to continue their co-operation
through solving the questions that faced the powers in the
Far Hast

p

in China

#

and particularly the problem of Russian aggression
^

Russian occupation of Manchuria, as

o.

result of the

Boxer Rebellion, had caused the world powers to express ap
prehension over the frequent rumors that Russia planned to
make Manchuria a protectorate*

Th© Russians had denied th©

^Meinecke, Gesohtchte, p. 177#
2Thomas Wodehouse Leigh Newton, Lord Lanadown©, A
Biography (London: Macmillan and Co., 1929)', p. 19?#
Here
after cited as Newton, Lans&owne. O# ?#* XVI*
36$#
B# D#,
II, 2 0 .
~
~ ~
^Melneoke, Oesehlchte, p. 176#

6£
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ruiaors and claimed that when the Boxer threat ended, Bussian
troops would be removed from Manchuria*^-

The Times reported

on January 3# 1901, that Russia had concluded a secret agree
ment with China providing for special concessions, if not a
port©atorate, in Manchuria*^

Th© report caused the European

powers, Japan, and the United States to express greater ap
prehension over Russian aggression and the possibility of an
impending partition of China*

The involved powers immediately

inquired as to th© validity of the rumored agreement and
attempted to form a policy to halt Russia*

The British

planned, if it was necessary, to rely upon the Yangtze Agree
ment of 1900, which they felt assured German support in
stopping Russian aggression*^
Tiie tense situation in the Far East caused the Brit
ish and German governments to consider for the third? and
final tim e ® the possibility of concluding an alliance*9
**B. D . ,
XGVI

II,

As

X.

5 < J re a t B r i t a i n , B r i t i s h a n d F o r e i g n S t a t e Paoers,
( 1 9 0 2 - 1 9 0 3 ) , 882, 1TH51 l e r e a F t e r c l t e d "as B
S
.
P.
6 G. P . , X V I I ,

3 1 1 -1 2 n . * .

" ^ J u lie n A m e r y , A t t h e H e ig h t o f H i s P o w e r , V o l . I V o f
Th© Life of Joseph CfaarnFer1 ain * J* L .^ a r v T r (h/vol s *; London 5
Macmillan and Co., 1^3^-1951) * IV, ll^l • Hereafter cited as
Amerv, Height of Power*
ft

The fact that th© 1901 attempt at an alliance was
the last such attempt caused many German historians, following
World War I, to believe that the War could have been avoided
if Germany had been more receptive to an alliance in 1901*
Keineck©, Fischer, and the Anglophile Eckardstein held the
above view*
^G ooch, H o ls te in

O r a c le , p*

5i|-9*
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I:i 1-998 and 1 ' 9

the ;■1 tua tl or. In China served as* th© basi.

Con ohe dl sens ;;ion of an undors tandlng.^
Britain1s Pan v astern 1'

The d on per to

a.; :;ta lea C h a mberlain^

and :he
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Teknristein was Fir;.;t Secretary in the Teraaan Fmbassy
Ir: London

11

oral had a n v o 1 a a an 1n termed 5ary between 'Britain
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L a n g e r , Diplomacy, II,

71j.l*

Bra n d e n b e r g ,

From

Pi anarch Tirld,, p p T T J F T .
^ J u l i o n Araory, !r» his biography of Joseph Cfoaniboi*lain, stated that th© Chamberlain Papers contained no trace
of hi,; ItQl ne^otUfi^s,
Amery, height of Power, P* I3?n. 1.
This raises th© question of whether dKamberlaln really had

ereeh to do vith the I P X negotiations, since •.•Is papers deal
quite extensively with the alliance questions of 1898 and
1809

and

only informal. :?on cn ObarJborlalrf3 role in the

1901 attempt comes from th© highly unreliable record of Kckardstein# In fact h chard s to* n mr. le only alight reference to
Chamberlain In the negotiations, particularly after March,
1 ?0I,
The only reference to th© 1901 discussions in th©
halfour biography— the source of this reference was not ^iven-stated that Chamberlain was "chiefly” responsible for Initi
ating tlio bailee » Dugdale, Pall our, T , 276* Though unreliable
in most areas, Fischer stated that Chamberlain, because of
ills two earlier failures at an alliance, was not particularly
interested ir an alliance in 1901 and that the pro-German
Lonsdown© was then Foreign Secretary and In control of for
eign policy*
Fischer stated that even Bckardstetn and Hol
stein realised this c.s It woo with Lars3 down© that they con
ducted the 1901 discussions#
Fischer, Fain, p# 211*
The
few doc uraen ts ir 13• 9• on the alliance question also made
only a few references' to Chamberlain#
B. D* T, II#

•^.Amr-ry, Height of Power, 17, II.}.1-?}.9*
x3b:o1s twin Papers, IV, 113n# U.
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and Germany during two Tvnevions attempts to T»esVn an aqreement.^

Ecteerdsteln,

le sincerely desiring an under

standing between Germany and Britain, was an

indi

vidual with strong hones of replacing Batzfeldt as Ambassa
dor.*^

Durlr.g the 1,901 regotlatl ons, Eekardstelr

as

the chief German negotiator and act*»d as the unofficial head
of the German Embassy#

The Eirat Secretary o b t a r>en h* s in

fluential position because the illness of Ratyfetdt r>r*vented
him from fulfilling his duties as Ambassador and forced him
to roly uoon Eokardstein •

In such a position ^'ckordsto: n

worked for an alliance by altering diplomatic correspondence^
and distorting the views of both the British and German gov
ernments on the* question of an understanding.^7

The foreign

offices in both Berlin and London viewed him. with suspicion
LL.Young, Harden, p. 1 6l*
-^arnery, Height of lower a IV, 1K2.
Holstein
Papers, IV, 296.
f*I
ADIt has been f 1rmly ostablisbed that Eekardstefr
changed, dispatches that H&tzfeldt instructed M m to send to
her 1 In. The problem is knowing how much, and when did Eckarasteln make these changes since he always signed Hatzfeldt**
name*
There is also the fact that many of the dispatches
sent were signed by Hatzfeldt, but Fckardsteln wrote them.
For a more detailed dlscuasion and examples of Ickarustelnfs
forging of documents see G. P., XVTT, lb
Graver,
Deutschland, pp. 7-6, 6 I n 7 1, 71*72, 110-11,
Hitter,
T.egerde, pp. 26-29.
!;ckardstelr», Ten Tears, o, 198.
^-71anger, Diplomacy, IT, ?27-2^.
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but failed to curb his a c t i o n s . I n

these circumstances

Eckardstein played a major role in the 1901 negotiations and

was probably responsible for in 11i P5n;. the alliance disous&

sa
i-on.a •1°
*'

On venuery

1 C

, 1001, Eckardotcir. ret vi th Chamberlain

at Chatsworth, the country estate of the i'ulre of Devonsbirej^

Hie two men discussed the world position of Orest Britain
and Anglo-Go m a n relation s «

Chamberlain stated M s

v lews that

the British policy of "splendid isclation" ue? obsolete and
said that Britain must obtain allies, ei ther France and Pus**
si a or from among the Triple Alliance powers•

An agreement

with Germany, ha said, and an association with th© Triple
Alliance was preferable; however, If such an arrangement
proved unlikely, an agreement with Russia was a real possi
bility*

Chamberlain told Eckardstein that he would work for

a German understanding,^*- but for the present an Anglo-German
iQ

Ceton-I 'ttfcscri, Lritslr., p. 5
iv, 314.0-ia.
^ G o o o h , B e fo re
of fover, IV,

the War, XI, 8,

.

i t elo;;, J'teolrs,
Amery, H e ig h t

rM c k a r d s tel o, Erl an c run gen , II, 23p -36.
In light of the frill ah Do curat nts, in which Laosdown© stated that Eckardstein offered an alliance on March 18,
1901, and that there trt; no records of s sug/ret tier, die sua
sion, or negotiation of an alliance until March 18, 1901,
there is th o possibility that there *:&s no discussion of a l 
l i a n c e at a l l In January, 1901, and if there was, it was
offered ry Eckardstein, wno is the only source of information
for the negotiations from January to March, 1901*
B* D., II,
76-79*
The fact that IcksrdsteIs iU aired an alliance to the
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agreement, over Morocco would serve as a basis for a later
alliance between the two governments*
possible

a.r-

soor:

Negotiations would be

Salisbury luff Tor the Fouth of Trance,

of oer w b i c h e and L»rsdowr*e voill M. in control and could
conclude on agreement*
Ms

The Colonial iecrctar;, except for

suggestion of a lor ocean agreement, wished, that hie com

ment a be considered as ac-ader.de :r

y

nature and a-

&

possible

sub je t. a"or further di eus sioru^
c

n

Lckarclsteln Informed. hot of clit of

h

i

s

con vers at Ion

with Chamberlain an-1 followed the Ambassadorfs Instructions
by notifying Berlin that the British were Interested in con
cluding an alliance with Germany•^3

Eckardsteir? and Hatz-

point that he would M e i upresent individual opinions and
documents and as a result of his part In the negotiations In
larch and lay £tf* Chapter ivj" only furthers the Idea that
Eckardstein possibly suggested the Ides of an alliance to
Chamber Is in* hekards ttin ir&y have even manuf acturtd M s en
tire record of the negotiations during January to March,
l t d , since he was the only Individual i.n the Terpen side
who talked with the British*
Whatever the role of Eckards teirj, those sent Iaien tc cxpr i stc d as tu oat of Thaa:BerlaIo
seemed to correspond with what would have been the opinions
of the Colonial Secretary*
Larger, Diplomacy, XI, 71?•
^hekardsfctir, lan Years, p* If6*
Brlnnerungen, II, 237*

Fck&rdst-eIn,

G* P* , XVII, llt-16*

must be remembered that Eckardstein was th© sole

interne diary between the I M i i M Fore-1 gr Cf;flee sxd M.tzfeldt
and the German Foreign Office until Kay 20, 1901, when H&tzfeint talked with Ban M oora . Io such d i cun.siuncea all the
information concerning the position of Germany and Britain
cn th u111 *.uoce c<u.t. ~Ojf*
-t-AiUt1C* sw. Cm.■ tl
‘©liable re
porting of Eckardstein* What Lansdowne and the British under
stood as the position of err.any depended ^ u o what Lekardstein told them just as what Katzfeldt, Holstein, and the
1 trr<;.an Fore Igo* Office bcliev <.d or toe British position also
t

I

depended on what Eckardstein reported.
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feldt, ac c o r d i n g to the former, were enthusiastic over the
possibility that ©vents might lead to an alliance.

With

such a hope in mind, Fatzfeldt s*nt r,oizt M n

a nrivate tele

gram, which he composed *n such a manner cu

;o avoid arousing

the Votragendor R a t *n onsr-iclous nat-u.ro ,

Tht

inhassador had

no desire to provoke Holstein1a distrust of Ohamborlain and
Salisbury, who, he felt, would r<ev*-.con?r;.-: t to an alliance. 2U
Hatsfaldt telegraphed that Ghamh :rlain had cunf irmed hir> b e 
lief that the M i t t sh woulG over, hue lly aerk Herman assistance
if the latter continued to express cr Interest In better re
lations.

If, however,

an agreement proved Infeasible with

Germany, the British would very possibly turn to Russia.

He

knew that Holstein would agree that at present an alliance
was premature, but Chamberlain seemed to concur with this
view and hoped that a special, agreement over Morocco might
lead to a future alliance.

For a time with the departure of

Salisbury to th© South of F r a n c e Chamberlain, Lansdowne, a n d
tne pro-German members of th© cabinet would b© in control of
British policy.

In such a situation, Hatzfeldt stated in

closing, th© British might seek an alliance. 25
The G e r m a n Foreign Office was skeptical about the
possibility of an understanding.

B u e l o w advised that, for

the present, Germany should continue to wait until the Br it^•Fokards to In, Mr Inns mu;-:o n , 17 , 237.

Eckardstein,

Ten Y e a r s , p;p. 1614-85.
%>Ibld.,

p. 187.

G. P., XVII,

16.
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1.*h too}? the initiative in m o n o s Ire* an alliance*

He onnosed

an agreement oven Morocco since a sim1 lan understanding over
the ^ontunuea© African oolo^l es had failed to ^^eate better
relations with, the British or tangible advantages for the
Germans.

Germany, Bn©low believed. show Id continue ho ex*

ores* Interest In the British desire #or an agreement and
always affirm the p o e s i M 11 tv of a future understanding*^
Buelow agreed with Holstein in the letter*s belief
that Britain would not soak an understanding with France or
Russia*

Such an idea, Holstein felt., was a complete fraud

and nonsense*

He asserted that possible concessions to

S’rance and Russia in return for support would merely confirm
the declining power and prestige of tb** British Emoire«

At

the present time, he felt, an Anglo-German alliance was im
possible as Britain was unwilling to concede th© necessary
concessions to obtain Germany*s support and such an agree
ment would imply the Involvement of Germany in a British war*
As in the past, Holstein said, Salj sbury was of the opinion
that the Germans asked ^oo much for the!■* friendship*

He

believed that, before eonsiderat1on of an understanding was
possible, Salisbury1s ill-treatment of Germany must be remo v©d, in spite of t h e friondliness of the always sua;-uct
Chamberlain*

17-l8>

Adhering to the oollcy of the “free hand*1,

26Amery, Height
of Power, XV, lJ.i7.
«

G. _P., XVII,

_
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Holstein stated, "we can wait, time is on our side."27
Richthofen, the State Secretary, agreed with Hol
stein ’s views on Eckardsteinfs report of a possible alliance.
He told Buelow, " ’Let England come to us*

The spectre of a

Russo-Engllsh alliance appears to me, after numerous conver
sations with Holstein, nothing but a spectre*f
The alliance negotiations were suddenly halted by the
fatal illness of Queen Victoria.

The Kaiser, on hearing the

news of his grandmother’s Illness, rushed to London against
th© wishes of both the Foreign Office and members of the Ger
man royal f a m i l y . ^

The Foreign Office feared that the Kai

ser would antagonize the British and, more Important, accept
or offer an alliance.

Holstein, hoping to curb th© Kaiser’s

actions, telegraphed Eckardstein to caution th© Emperor
against discussing an alliance or any other major problems
with the British ministers.

Eckardstein met th© Kaiser on

his arrival on January 20, and related the substance of his
conversation with Chamberlain, as well as th© warning of Hol
stein.

The Kaiser was quite optimistic about th© possibility

of an alliance; however, he agreed only to discuss AngloGerman relations in general terms*3^
27Amery, Haight of Power. IV, lt*8-U9.
G. P., XVII,
22-23*
Eckardstein, ErInne run r en, II, 261-62.
Eckardstein,
Ten Years, p. 1 8 7 .
^ G o o c h , Holstein Oracle, p. 1}.60.
^Eckardstein, Er 1nn e run gen, II, 239-Lj.O.
3°Ibld., 25U•

Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 188-951
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The Kaiser, following his arrival, telegraphed Buelow
that his reception in Britain was overwhelming.

Both th©

British public and royal family were greatly touched by his
rushing to the bedside of his ill grandmother.

H© was also

pleased with Eckardstein*s report that Britain desired an
alliance and agreement over Morocco.

On th© basis of Eckard

stein *s reporting, the Kaiser believed, contrary to the views
held In the Foreign Office, that Britain would reach an
understanding with Franc© and Russia if an agreement with
Germany proved Improbable.

The Kaiser felt, however, that an

Anglo-German alliance appeared quite possible.31
The Kaiser’s optimistic report increased the appre
hension of Buelow and Holstein that Vilhelm II might concede
or offer an alliance.

Holstein and the Chancellor, to avert

any rash action by the Kaiser, dispatched telegrams to
Vilhelm II, Eckardstein, and Count Paul von Mettem i c h ,

th©

Foreign Office representative traveling with the Kaiser,
counseling against appearing too optimistic If the British
hinted at the possibility of an alliance.32

Buelow advised

the Kaiser, employing the arguments of Holstein in a lengthy
and subtle

dispatch,

^G.

33 that he was correct in believing that

P., XVII, 19.

3^1b i d .. 22-23.
Holateln Papers. IV, 217-18.
Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, p p . 'I55~5>7.
33compare Buelow’s dispatch G. F h , XVII, 20-21, and
Holstein’s G. P., XVII, 22-23.
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the British were considering a German alliance and pointing
out the need for such an offer to come from London.
tain an understanding, the Chancellor advised

To ob

that the K a i 

ser should appear interested but not too eager In the conver
sations with the British.

The British, he argued, would, in

future months, feel their growing isolation and be willing to
grant greater concessions in return for German support.

The

Kaiser, he suggested, should remain optimistically n o n 
committal. 3UHolstein added, In a dispatch to Eckardstein, that
he should do his “best with the British Ministers, or anyhow
see that something Is at once done to make them, insist on
courteous treatment for the Kaiser."3?

The Vortragender Rat

always distrusted the British and felt that much of the op
position to the Kaiser came from the British royal family
and Salisbury.3^
The Kaiser complied with the wishes of the Foreign
Office and conducted himself in the proper manner throughout
his stay in Britain.37

Even so, th© Kaiser hoped for an Im

mediate alliance and told Metternlch that he disliked the
policy of waiting.

He quipped prophetically, “he gained

3(
4-Amery. H.lpcht of Power. IV. 1U9.
20-21.

G. P.. XVII.
~ “

"^Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 190.
36rbia.

Eckardstein, Erlnnerungen, II, 261-62.

37 Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, p. 158.

?6
nothing by continually vacillating between Russia and Great
Britain.

He would lose his balance and fall between the two

stools."38
During his lengthy visit to Britain the Kaiser had
several discussions with British cabinet ministers and the
new king, Edward ¥11, who, at this time, favored an under
standing with

G e r m a n y

.39

W i l h e l m II,

in his conversations

with the British, refrained from discussing an alliance ex
cept in general terms and restricted his comments to requests
for better relations between the two nations.

II© also at

tacked the Russians for their Far Eastern policy and empha
sized, as much as possible, the isolated position of Britain*
'The British must realize, the Kaiser said, that the balance
of power resided in Germany’s twenty-two army corps.

The

British, in spite of the Kaiser’s statements, welcomed the
presence of VMlhelra II as an indication of better relations
between the two countriesJ*®
The suspicious Holstein, even with the positive re
ports of the K a i s e r ’s visit, commented on January 30, that
he hoped Wilhelm II would not remain too long in Britain,
thereby avoiding a possible alienation of the British as had
3 8G. P., XVI,

295.

39phllip Magnus, King Edward th. Seventh (London!
John Murray, 196Lp), p. 272.
Hereafter cited as Magnus,
Edward the Seventh.

k°G. P., XVII, 23-29, XVI, 291, 295-96.
Ten Years, ~pp7 191-92, 195-96.

Eckardstein,

resulted at Cowes In 1395*

Holstein warned Eckardstein

.igalnst
some .English politician or other, for example Salisbury
(of whom I shall always have a lively recollection on
account of Samoa, the mai1stearners, etc.), If it oc
curred to Salisbury for example, to exploit the candour
and compliance of His Majesty in order to secure some
binding promise.
It is your /Eckardstein/ business,
dear Friend, to watch carefully for ©very indication of
this in London officia! circles in order that proper
precautions may be taken ir. time,^**
In. closing Ills dispatch, Holstein indicated the great extent
to which the German Foreign Office depended upon Eckardsteinfs
reporting, when he said, f?but wha t th© British ministers may
be concocting, if we /tTbe 3erlin Foreign Office/ can't see—
you probably

can.

Hi© effect of the Kaiser’s visit, regardless of Hol
s tein’s reservations, resulted in the friendliest relations
between Great Britain and Germany since the Kruger

t e l e g r a m , U3

Both the British and Germans t ooit advantage of thoir friendly
relations by co-operating in solving the growing difficul
ties in the Far E a s t . ^

By the end of January Japan, Britain,

and Germany were still unable to ascertain the validity of
the reported January 3

agreement between China and Russia.

The three powers continued to wait for further developments
u n t i l ^ February 7# when the British received the terms of
k b b l c U , p. 191;.

^2I b l d .. p. 193-9!;.

U-3liangei>, Diplomacy. II, 718.

Vtijbld., 719.

the Russian-Chlnese Agreement from the Japanese Ambassador,
Count hayashi•

Hie Japanese government also requested that

a joint declaration be sent to China warning her against con
cluding agreements with any power, unless approved by the
remaining powers involved in the Boxer hostilities#

The

Japanese felt that such a move would prevent Russia from
pressuring

China into concluding any agreements. W 1

Lansuowne communicated the Japanese request to Eck
ardstein, who was to ascertain whether or not Germany would
send a similar declaration.

Both Eckardstein and Eafzfeldt

dispatched telegrams to Berlin relating Lansdowne’s nessage
and advised the Foreign Office to comply with the British
and Japanese request.

If Germany cent a d i r c t refusal,

hatzfe'ldt telegraphed, Britain could very easily seek an
understanding with the .dual Alliance and end all prospects
for an Anglo-German all lance* *1*7

Hatzfeldt sent another

warning and recommended compliance with the British and
Japanese wish but not to the point of antagonizing Russia or
appearing to support, too strongly,
.bast#

the British in th© Par

Nothing must occur to endanger Germany’s alliance

policy, which iiatzf ©Idt reaffirmed as follows:

T,w© must

wait until th© British will support us unconditionally, and
in the meantime Germany should remain on a good footing with
d.

II, 3£-36.

?9

Russia *w^

Buelow agreed unequivocally wi th Hat»feldt * ^

Holstein, in a series o.f telegrams to Buelow and
London, stated Germany*:? policy in the Far Fact and replied
to the British.and Japanese request for action against Ghina*
The Vor tragend er .17at agreed to send a mild warning to the
Chinese, but, in so doing, Germany, for the time being, must
avoid antagonizing Russia over* Manchuria*

He hoped the Ger

man warning would satisfy the B r i t i s h * B u e l o w agreed with
Holstein*?? policy and added that any stronger support of the
British in China world so inflame public opinion that a fu
ture traders tending might prove impossible *Si
Or February 11, Holstein developed in more detail
his views on German policy in the Rgtr Bast and or the alli
ance question.

Holstein telegraphed Hatzfeldt that he agreed

that relations with Britain required the minimizing o.f dif
ferences between the two nations*

He and Hatzfeldt had often

discussed the question of an Anglo-German understanding and
he felt that
an alliance, In which each party d e a l s with a single ag
gressor and the casus foederis only arises when there is
more than one foe, has many attractions for the thought
ful statesman, but would unfortunately be in direct con
flict with German opinion to-day*
The systematic cam
paign against England, which began after Bismarck’s re
tirement, Is largely due to the intolerable personality
of Salisbury, whose antipathy to the German Emperor and
sympathy for Franc© have shaped English policy during

k 8lbid., XVII, 30-33.

^9Ibld.# 33.

^°Ibld. , XVI, 315-16.

Gtbld., ,316-19.
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the la at decade*
Tills policy revealed itself as brutal
and u n t r u s t w o r t h y * 52
H© also believed that the difficulties over the Samoan ques
tion, the Bundesrath affair, and Salisbury’s action at Cowes
in 1895 exemplified the unwillingness of the British Prim©
Minister to co-operate with Germany*

More harmful to Anglo-

German relations, Holstein said, was Britain’s refusal to
implement the agreement for the partition of the Portuguese
African colonies*

In addition Britain failed to acknowledge

Germany’s neutrality in the Boer Var*

He believed that pub

lic discontent, over Britain’s failure to co-operate with
Germany, diminished 'the possibility of an Anglo-German alli
ance*

An in derstandir.g, he felt, would only lncrea.ee th©

public attacks against the Chancellor and thc !<aiscr for con
cluding an agreement that yielded little merit and caused
German subservience to Irltloh

interests*

£3

The attitude of

the German public, wrote holstein,
could not be altered 'by assurance but only by facts,
namely if the defensive treaty, apart from a fullysecured -reciprocity, carried with it direct advantages,
not mere promises*
It must be emphasized that the offer
of an alliance cannot proceed from Germany*
For first,
I do not believe that England will make acceptable con
cessions so long as Salisbury has a say, and. I think it
unworthy of a Groat Power again to b© told: You ask
too ranch for your friendship*
And secondly, alter all
our experiences with Salisbury, he could quit© well in
form St* Petersburg of our offer and its conditions and
a3k:
i/hnt do you offer? In spit© of Lansdowne *s desire

33

-3 7 .

^uooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. U61-62.
53lbid.

G. 1:., XVII,
- ~

for an alliance, the opposition of Salisbury demanded
Germany to wait until the English guaranteed the terms
of complete reciprocity and agreed upon instantaneous
concessions--colonial possessions.
Until these terms are met England must he satisfied
with the German policy of neutrality which Germany can
not go beyond.
Such is the position ir T T r a .
No
power desires war arid the combined action of England and
Japan along with German neutrality will serve to keep
Russia in check as far as Russian aggression concerns
Germany.
There exists no present reason to unnecessarily
antagonize Russia and particularly not to save and pro
tect English Far Eastern interests.
Englandfs position, owing to Japanese co-oprat5.on
and the certainty of the neutrality of th© Triple Alli
ance, is exceptionally good and can only become worse.
Thus an alliance with Germany is unnecessary for the;
attainment of her present aims. The German people could
only be convinced by positive facts that a treaty did

not serve English
Holstein believed that there was no rear: on for Trite in or
Gerrasr.y to conclude an a111 an ce, but h c fe 1 1; an v nd trstnodIng
i'e s

desirable and possible, if Frit©In would meet Terr any* s

terms.

Tie policy of the ftfrec hand” was rtill the roof

profitable'.

Buelow, 5n his marginal conrerts or Fclfltein,s

dispatch, agreed with, the Vcrtr agender

V

a t*s

v

i

e

w

s

on the

alliance and Far Faff err quest? ons.^5

quest*

or

of an alliance as they were for ^r.rc tore erred with

^ G o o c h , Holstein Oracle, H61-62.

33-37.

'

G.F., XVII,

~

-JIbid.
Holstein, Buelow, und the Germans expressed
ex;
similar sentiments in the followings
G. P., XVI, 320-2£>
IV, 210-3.9, and 1'cfcrrcfeteir, Ten Tears,
pp.

2 0 1 -2 0 2 .
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faced Britain and the other powers was the obtaining of an
agreement on the amount of the Chinese indemnity, which was
to pay the expenses of the powers in suppressing the Boxer
Rebellion*

Bermany hoped to obtain British support for her

demands in the indemnity settlement by co-operating with
Britain, as much as possible, in the Far hast*

The British

also desired German support but for the more important prob
lem of halting Russian stress ion In Manchuria. 57
The nowars had rot learned until February 28, that
the notes warning China syairst concluding separate agree
ments had failed to prevent Russia from forcing the Chinese
to conclude an agreement over Manchuria.

To prevent the im

plementation of the Manchurian agreement, th© British and
Japanese, who were seriously considering military action
against Russia, hoped to obtain the support of Germany in
opposing the Russians.

The German government replied to the

British and Japanese inquiries as to Germany’s policy in the
Far East by reaffirming the position of neutrality.

Th©

German® were opposed to any action that would antagonise th©
Russians, but they hoped to influence the Japan©®© and Brit
ish to take a strong stand against the Russians.

The Ger

mans possibly desired to involve Britain In a Far Eastern
war thereby forcing the British to seek German assistance In
the form of an alliance.

To the dismay of the Germans, the

83
British failed to take any strong action against the Russians
and continued to wait for further developments*^
The British finally decided to act or- IVt.rch 6.

Lana-

downe inquired whether Germany, In the interests of peace#

would consent to a joint declaration that if war broke out
between Japan and Russia that such a conflict would be lo

calized*

Great Britain and Germany would remain neutral as

long as no other power, meaning France# intervened in th©
The British suggestion resulted from a fear of a pos

war*

sible war and that Japan might conclude a separate agreement
with Russia that would leave Britain isolated*

In any case

the British, as a result of the South African War, needed
German support in order to protect their Far Eastern inter
ests*^
Holstein, in reply to Lansdowne’s request, tele
graphed Eckardstein that he opposed a special agreement,
whereby Germany and Britain would declare neutrality in the
ease of a Russo-Japanese war, because in all special agree
ments
the danger was greater than the advantage.
By such a
treaty we take sides against Pus sia 5n fee 511 tat?rg a
Japanese offensive*
bhereas German action against Pus-

£%ckartietelr!, (Ter rearc. rr. 201-22.
3 5 -1(1

, U 3 -l',5 .
IV, 2X9.

o. r ., XVI, 3 2 6 -hO.
“

f».

II,

HolstelrfPapers,

$9C. p., XVI, 31:1-1.’?,, TVTT, l>0-l<ln.*#*. Our dale,
German Diplomatic. Ill, 12*0.
B. D., I, 332, II, k3-b5»
?!-£6.
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sia that would be a breach ox neutrality is impossible,
so long as v© can get no guarantee from the British,
For that reason we shall make our declaration of neutral
ity separately . . . • England is obviously trying to
make use of us without binding Itself to anything--which
i t won ’f. succeed in doing.
In a further comment on Germany1s Per Eastern uolie?r Holstein
stated s
We can11 go beyond benevolent neutrality, as the very
restricted agreement of October 16th ^fangtzo AgreementT*
provides no Anglo-German solidarity in case the Rus
sians and the french Doth attack us,In Europe on account
of our proceedings in Eastern Asia.®i
These views of Holstein expressed the attitude of th© German
government toward th© Far Eastern situation*62
In the same dispatch to Eckardstein, Holstein re
lated th© circumstances under which Germany would follow an
aggressive policy toward Russia and gave a definition of th©
terns for an Anglo-German Alliance.

Holstein stated:

1 may observe for your ^ c k a r d s t e l n / personal opinion
that the position ^/bene volant neutrality in the Far &&at/
would be very different if there were a defensive al
liance between Great Britain and Germany.
This .might be
to the effect that each contracting party should fight
one adversary on its ovm account, the treaty to come in
to fore© as soon as there were two or more adversaries.
If in that case, England, probably with Japan, fought
Russia alone, w© should he neutral unless and until.
France joined in, which in that case it would certainly
not do. Indeed, England and Jaoan would be so superior
go Russia that the latter would give way without fighting
when it came to the point.
But, meantime, you must on no account raise this
fo

Eckardstein, fen Tears, pp. 202-20%*
bid

o 2g

.

. i>, XVII, l*o—1.1, XVI, 3i|i,

5•

idea.
It must come from them, and of this there is no
prospect so long as Lord Salisbury is involved*
Ny personal view is that Germany could more easily
accede to such a g m o r a l defensive acresmcut than to a
special agreement, concerning, sav, Morocco, in which
the danger would be the same and the advantages less.
But I repeat, you must -Of raise th$ s now, if only be
cause I d o n *t trust Toud Salisbury not to make use of a
German overture 1n Petersburg*
If only we could 'pacify ov.r nubile opinion in th one
single real roatr-.rl rl advantage that we hav' got from
association with Great '^rit-ain• She Zanzibar agreement,
where m gland got the 1 ion1a share, has l e ft a. *
v ad im
pression, so has the Portuguese agreement which is s till
unrealised*
Freiherr von Richthofen has just been in to
show me the savage attacks • • • against count von
Duelow, who is aceused of too gr eaf comp1iance wit b. the
hnglish proclivities of the Kaiser*
For tnis reason too
I TlARN' -TLY hope Fngland will meet us In the Chinese in
demnity and customs question.
fork for it all you can*®3
baring March the Far Fas tern situation remained un6b
changed ’ until huelow delivered uis Keichstag speech of
AV
March
The Chancellor stated that the October 16, 1900,
Yangtze Agreement was nin no sense concerned with Manchurlatt
and ntho fate of that province was a matter of absolute in
difference to Germany. n^ r'
J

Until Buelowrs speech, the British

had interpreted the Yangtze Agreement as Including Manchuria
under the provision insuring the integrity of On n a , ;j? but
the German incerprstation destroyed Britain’s belief that
she could depend on German support for halting liussian ag63l b i d ., t>p. 203-20!;.
6M -

]>•» I. 3;i2, :

f‘-’I bid. , XX, 27.

F r o l d . , I, 332-33.

Eckardstein, Sr 1nnerung en ,
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gression in M a n c h u r i a * ^

The British contested the German

interpretation, and a long dispute followed over the proper
interpretation of the Yangtze Agreement*

The dispute in

creased the distrust between the two governments, but it was
In this atmosphere of distrust and tension that Eckardstein
offered Lord Lans&own© a defensive a l l i a n c e * ^

68

Langer, Diplomacy, II, 722*

Taylor, Kastery, 395*

69B. D., II, 27-29, 3U-38, 1|6, 60-61.

CHAI’Ti R IV
FHIEDHICH VON HOLSTEIN AND THE SEGOND PHASE
OF THE 1901 ATTEMPT AT AN ALLIANCE
On March 19, 1901, Eckardstein telegraphed both th©
Berlin. Foreign Office and Holstein that Lansdowne had offered
Germany a defensive alliance.^

In actuality Eckardstein had

offered the Britt sh an alliance and, in so doing, had acted
against official instructions, Which stipulated that Eckard
stein was to wait until Britain took the initiative by
offering an alliance*2

Eckardstein reported that the British

had mad© the offer in order to avoid the suspicion of Hol
stein, who would have violently condemned him for having gone
beyond his instructions.^

As early as March 9, Holstein

stipulated that "on no account*1 was Eckardstein to suggest
the possibility of an understanding*^-

Holstein repeated th©

warning as late as March 17, the day before Eckardstein forh-

£•> XVII, ]il-!i.2.

2,ails March 13, 1901, meeting was the first record
in the B. D* concerning the 1901 alliance question*
B, D . ,
II, 60-51,~"69.
hanger, diplomacy, II, 729-30.
~ “
3Eckardfsteln, Ten Years, p. 208.
Erlnnervmgen, II, 273*
H b i d . , II, 3H'-15.

201*.,

87

Eckardstein,

Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 203-
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mally offered an alliance.

Holstein said, WI forbid you

expressly, my dear friend, even to breathe a word about an
alliance.

The proper moment, if it ever comes, is certainly

not now.”

Eckardstein had. not received Holsteinfs March 1?,

warning until after he had offered an alliance, hut he knew
that he was not even to mention an understanding.5
Before Eckardstein offered an alliance, he attempted
to prepare the Berlin Foreign Office for the announcement of
a suggested a g r e e m e n t H e

telegraphed Holstein on March 10,

that Chamberlain had informed him that British proceedings
with the Germans had been communicated to the Russians9
therfore, Hal is bury was considering accepting the Puss Ian
proposals for co-operation in China*

Kcknrdstein may have

felt that by employing the threat of a Russo-British under
standing he might obtain the support of the Berlin ForeJgn
Office for a British alliance.

Chamberlain continued by

stating that, except for the leakage of information to the
Russians,? Britain "would gladly approach Germany with, farreaching proposals which would assure it as great advantages
„

an, or even greater advantages then? ourselves.

rt

■

The Coloni

al Secretary still believed in the principle of an alliance,
f
-d: ckardstein , Ter Ye n ra , p. 207.

% b i d *, p. 20 0.
153•

Eckardstein, Brinnerungen, TX., 200-Si

?Ibid., I I , 277-70.
Amery, Height of Power, IV,
Eckardstein, Ter Years, pp. 20lT-?Q5T
8Ibld., p. 205.

but he would not initiate any action for an agreement, as in
1099, since "he was not partieularly anxious to burn ills
fingers a second time#"9
Holstein expressed apprehension over Kckardsteinfa

report of leakages to Hussis, but he reaffirmed his beliof
that Go m a n y must not take the initiative in seeking an al
liance with B r i t a i n . ^

Ho informed Eckardstein that

it seems to me very significant that the British Gov
ernment, while trying to push us forward, /fhe British

desire for German

.opt against Puss5a in the Far

East*7 says nothing about any alliance.

Salisbury is

riore than ever the ruler of England.
If the British are driven h r Salisbury and Ohl.ro! /5ie
Times reporter who favored a Ruaso-British agreement/

into' going with Russia, let them try it.

Xt 1 3 th©

treaty of the wolf and the lamto.^*^
Holstein felt that a Russo-Brltish agreement was improbable
and that the possibility of such an agreement was not a suf
ficient reason for offering the British an alliance . ^
Eckardstein disregarded Holstein1s instructions and
offered the British an alliance.

Lord Larsdowne was skep

tical of the German offer, particularly when Eckardstein
stated that his suggestion was not authorised.

Eckardstein

told th© Poreign Secretary that he was speaking with only
limited authority.

sdewne, though with reservations, In—

9fhe truth of Eckardstein18 March 18, 1901, report
is doubtful.
Ibid.
lOibtd., pp. 2C5-206.
■*-2Tb'i d .

^ I M d .. pp. 206-207.

EcknrdatcJn, Erinnerungen. IX, 279.
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terpreted th® offer as being legitimate.2-3

In Berlin Hoi*

stein and the Foreign Office shared Lansdowne1s skepticism
and particularly doubted Salisbury!s support for an agree
ment, but, like Lansdowne, they accepted Eckardstein fs re
port as fact. 11*

Thus th© actions of Eokardsteir. led both

th© Germans and the British to be.11 e ve that the other eagerly

sought an alliance.

In the official sense there was not

a 1901 attempt at an Anglo-German u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Once

this was known the alliance discussions seemed ridiculous
and lessened the importance of the negotiations as the final
opportunity for an Anglo-German understanding. 2-7

This also

gives rise to the highly speculative questionthat
there might have been an Anglo-German agreement
stein had not suggested an understanding in 1901.

possibly

If Eckard
Whether a

later agreement was possible or not, the alliance discussions
In 1901 were Important for the participants involved, and
both nations seriously considered the possibility of an un 
derstanding.^^
^ 3r

v

tt

f f w

1

rs^,P. *5

? h'QGG ch , St-UCii OS , p . ( / •

^Amery, Height of Iover, IT, Ib^j.
•i^Gooeh, Kolste! n Oracle , p. L6H.
Deutschland, passim. r

Dreyer,

-i?Langer, Diplomacy, II, 729.
XVII, XVIII, passim.
passim.

B. D., I, II,
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Gurlrg a conversation or March 1 %

Faradowne reported

th°t Hoknrdf? tel n h.n.d o f f e r e d ^ an alii a n B e f o r e

Hakard—

stein hoi. m.\g r a t e d or An hi ©-German ur»d ©ms tandl ng, he and
Lars down e d5 scussed th© a* trrti or in the Far Kant— the avertInn* of a P h s s o — Tamaror.© war, the German Intorpret.at* or of*
the

/»•-■'recmen t , an d the ^mropsl.hil*

o.f Angl o —9-o m a n

■^j&ckardsteinf3 plan for an alliance was ©van more
encompassing• At the same time that he offered Britain an
alliance, Eckardstein suggested to the Japanese Ambassador
in London, Boron HavashI , that h© offer* Lord Laris-down© on
Anglo-Japanese-German alliance directed against Russia in
the hr* East # Oermanv, said Fekardsteln, was Interested and
would support such an agreement.
Lekardstein said in his
Memoirs, Eckardstei.n, Ton Ycqpg, pp. 210-11, that he hod
suggested an Anglo-Japanese-German alliance in order to
stimulate bans down©fs interest 1.n an Anglo-German alliance
and to prevent Japan from concluding a Far Eastern agreement
with Russia.
Baron Havashl followed Eckardstein *s advice
but only suggested an alliance between Japan and Britain
to Lansdownc.
Fckordoteln, Tan Years, p p • 207-1 1 . Ja^an
and Britain eventually reached "agreement In the AngloJapanose Treaty/” of 1902*
h e original * loo for mi Anglo—
Japanese-Gerraany treaty cam© from Eckardstein and raises the
quest;! on, if Kokands tel n hod r>ot mad© the suggest!on possibly
Great Britain would have been forced to seek support from
only Germany ins beau of Britain concluding the agreement with
Japan, in 1902.

For the most author!tire treatment of Tickardstain1s
role In b.hr Anglo-Japanese n,r©aty negotiations see A* M.
Vooley (ed. }, The Secret hemoirs of Count Tadaau llayashl
(Londons f,v-©leieh V a«k, ipi.9) , p"' • 119 -'*>?7 20T-2TTTh here
after cited as Poolev, hemolrs Hayashl.
^ K c k a r d s tain1s and Lanadowne1s version of the March 19^
1901, conversation are completely different. Both attributed
the initiative to the other, but apparently the bansdowne
version of th© alliance was the more accurate. EcknrdsteinLs
version was important, ivwevti-, since it was the basis upon
wPiioh the foreign Office and Holstein acted In the 1901 al
liance question.
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action in the Far Feet*

Bansdown© reported that Fckardstein

said that Germanj vas unable to take any act/!.or) in China but
that s h e ^ would consider "an understandirq; of a '■none durable
and extended character*’ w5 th Brl t a i n * E c k a r d s t e i n

stated

that such an undorstandiny mi'let be of n purely defensive
nature•

It was to be directed a/al nst the

Aliianr*^ and

would require any adherent o" the ayrcement to provide sup
port when two or more powers attacked an adherent of the al
liance*

Eckardstein said that hritian would benefit most

i r om t/.ii. alliance since Germany wovia be required to defend
BritainTs scattered Empire*

Lord Lansdown# replied that

Germany's lengthy frontier with Russia was just as vulnerable*
Bansdown* was receptive to the Idea of an alliance*
but he felt that several problems would have to be solved be 
fore th© conclusion of an

a g r e e m e n t * ^3

He believed that

such a contract seemed * * * to entail theadoption of
an identic foreign policy by both rowers tn all their
external relations, because every complication in which
one of the two might become Involved t.1vht drsz the,
other into th# quarrel • • * it was far from easy to
distinguish between the case in which a country was
acting on th# defensive and the case in which It was not.
The first blow might be really struck in self-defense;
or, conversely, an attack might be brought on by pol
itical action of a deliberately provocative character*
How were our mutual obligations to be defined so as to
meet all such cases fairly?**!
In addition to those problems, Bans&own© felt, Eckardstein*a
offer f,was a novel and very far-reaching one, which wovli
21B. 0., IX, 60-61.

22Ibld.. 61.

23ibld., 60-61.

21+Ibld., 61.
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require careful examination•11

He told Eckardstein that un 

til he consulted his colleagues he was unable to give any
encouragement as to the conclusion of such an agreement.
Eckardstein1s record of the March 18, conversation
is much more optimistic than Lansdownefs version,

Eckard

stein telegraphed that, after discussing the situation in the
Far East, Lansdowne proposed a long-term defensive alliance.
According to Eckardstein, Lansdowne said:
He believed that several of his most influential col
leagues would favor the idea. England w^s now at a
turning point and must make up its mind as to what line
it would take in the future.
But, should such an idea
be put into concrete form by the Cabinet, no official
proposal would b© made to Germany until there was some
certainty that Germany would be disposed in principle
to accept it.
I /5ckardatein7 replied that I was not in a position
to tell him whether and to what extent the Imperial
Government would favour such a proposal when made.
If
he would put forward a definite idea I would not fail to
report it to Berlin.
I shall of course sit still and see whether Lord
Lansdowne comes forward wi th anything in th© next few
days.
I should however, be grateful for precise in
structions as to my reply as soon as possible.
M y impression is that th© Cabinet hare, including
Salisbury, are really now at a parting of the ways as
to their future policy in general and as to China in
particular, and that in the course of th© next few days
w© shall know definitely.26
Eckardstein*s version of th© March 18, conversation was not
an accurate account, but it was the basis upon which Holstein
and th© Berlin Foreign Office considered an alliance with
2% b i d . , 61.
“ Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 207-208.
XVII, lj.l-l+2.

G. P.,
“ “
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Britain after March, 1901.
Buelow and th® German Foreign Office gave serious
consideration to Eckardstein1s report.

Eh© Chancellor was

receptive to the idea of an alliance, but he said it would
be difficult to obtain the support of the Reichstag for such
an agreement.

Among th® problems Involved was th® attitude

and relationship of Germany's allies in the Triple Alliance
toward an understanding.

He also objected to Germany having

to protect the threatened colonial possessions of Britain
while German colonies were in no such dangerous position.
Buelow said that the German government was no longer enthu
siastic about obtaining colonial possessions, but the German
public would b© difficult to conciliate If Germany did not
receive a share of any future colonial acquisitions by Britain.
The discussions should continue, the Chancellor stated, if
the proposed alliance assured only th© security of present
possessions and provided that Germany might receive future
colonial concessions from the British.

In th© meantime

Eckardstein was to inform the British to approach the Austrlans.

If th© Austrlans were willing, Germany would be

ready to negotiate, and possibly Japan might be drawn Into
the agreement.^7
Buelow also agreed with Holstein *s views on the pos
sibility of an alliance . ^

Holstein informed Eckardstein

27lbld., XVII, kl~b5>
Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, p. 161.
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that the present moment ifas decisive as Germany and Britain
were at the parting of the wavs*

He felt an alliance was

possible, but there were obstacles*

The current propaganda

for a Russo-German agreement in Germany was possible to over
come, but the most difficult obstacle to an alliance was the
distrust between Germany and Britain.

The British, he said,

had recently become distrustful, but Germany has had such
cause since Bismarck offered the British an alliance in 1887.
Holstein stated that German policy since

1

S 8 7 had

favored neither Russia nor Britain more than the other*

The

natural allies of Germany were Austria and Britain, but until
the support of both were obtained it was necessary to main
tain friendly relations with Russia.
Holstein then informed Eckardstein of Germany’s terms
for an alliance.

Be said:

To facilitate an exchange of views and to conciliate
public opinion, it would be more practical to give th©
rapprochement the character of an accession by England
to the" ^rigie' Alliance rather than an Anglo-German
aliiance. °
Austria would gladly support such an idea, and to further
facilitate negotiations the discussions should be transferred
to Vienna.

Chamberlain’s charge of leakages to Russia would

then be removed, and possibly some positive and useful agree
ment might be reached.

Holstein felt that it was improbable

that Salisbury was willing to offer any positive proposal,
^Eckardstein,

Ten Years, pp. 208-209.
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but if the Prime finister was serious a possible agreement
might be obtained by conducting the negotiations through
Vienna.

If the negotiations progressed, Japan might even

join the alliance.

*?n

Eckardstein feared that, if he informed the British
thet the negotiations would have to be transferred to Vienne,
the British would feel that Berlin was not serious about an
agreement.

The alliance discussions would come to an end,

and all of his work would have been for nothing.

He, there

fore, failed to notify Lansdowne of the important stipulation,
but he kept the Austrian Ambassador informed of the alliance
discussions just in case th© negotiations were transferred
to Vienna.3^
On March 23* Eckardstein reported that he had an
other profitable conversation with Lansdowne.32

According

to Eckardstein, Lansdowne stated that he had submitted a
memorandum for a possible defensive alliance to Balfour and
Salisbury.

Th© Prim© Minister agreed to support a strictly

defined defensive agreement, but Salisbury stated that all
eventualities must be seriously considered and that a method
3°lbld.

Eckardstein, Erlnnerongen, II, 28I-8I4..

3^Ibld., II, 236.

Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 210.

3^Th© only record of this conversation Is in th©
G. JP. XVII, I46-ij.6 , and is based on solely Eckardstein1s re
porting.
The meeting probably never took place and the sub
stance of the conversation probably occurred on March 18,
1901.
For a more detailed discussion see Longer, Diplomacy,
II* 730, and B. D., II, editorial note 61.
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be devised for removing the opposition of Parliament to a
long-term understanding.33

Eckardstein *n reporting \*as In

correct as Salisbury definitely op osed an alliance. 3k
Eckardstein had possibly distorted the views of th© British
Prim® Minister in order to obtain Berlin’s support for an
agreement•35
Th© discussion then turned to the specific terms of
the proposed alliance.

Lansdowne, according to Eckardstein,

asked if Germany would consent to an alliance, and Eckard
stein replied in the affirmative if Britain joined the Triple
Alliance3^

and accommodated Germany in solving the out

standing questions facing the two nations.

The British For

eign Secretary then enquired if th© agreement was to b© a de
fensive alliance or did the terns of th© agreement stiplulate
that the casus foederis arose only when on© of the parties
to the understanding was attacked by two or more powers.
German:/, said Eckardstein, preferred the latter.

Lansdowne1s

next question was whether th© agreement was to be secret or
approved by Parliament?

Eckardstein replied that th© agree-

33pugdal©, German Dt plomatlc, III, 1U1-U2.
XV XI , ij.6—ipd.
B . £). , 'jx , 0<£l.

G. <P.,

3% b l d . . 66-69.

35jjuKdftX«, German Diplomatic.

XVII, !4.6-ii«.

Ill, llil-L.2.

B.""d:V"TI, Vf. ----

G. P..

- “

^

36 vhi 3 appears to he false. At this t me the British
w©r© unaware that the German terms called for Britain to join
the Triple Alliance.

raent must be approved b y Parliament.

He also added, that the

inclusion of Japan might be profitable*

To avoid the suspi

cion of Berlin, Eckardstein telegraphed th© Foreign Office
that he had not suggested transferring the negotiations to
Vienna as *the
discussions had not developed to t h a t e x t e n t . 37
•
Buelow agreed with Eckardstein*s replies to Lans
downe fs questions -and informed him that the next step was to
wait until the British presented further suggestions for an
alii ance*3®

In addition to Buelow* s Instructions Holstein

reminded Eckardstein that in order to avoid confusion and a
misunderstanding the first real offer of an alliance mast
com© through Vienna*

Another advantage to negotiating In

Vienna was that Genaany would be more assured of British
support to the Triple Alliance and would discourage the Brit
ish from the idea of an Anglo-German alliance*

The Vortra-

gendcr Rat warned Eckardstein that he was to refrain from
any action until Britain agreed to hold discussions in Vienna*
Eckardstein continued to disregard Holsteinvs instructions
and failed to inform Lansdowne that the negotiations were to
be conducted in Vienna*

On March 26, Holstein complained that the alliance
discussions were not progressing.

He felt that the opposi

tion of Salisbury to an agreement had delayed the negotiations
37q, p * XVII, h6-h8 *
III, 11*1-U 3*
38i b l d .. Ill, 11+3-UU.

Dugdal©, German Diplomatic,
0. P., XVII, 1*8-1*9.

and that as long as Salisbury remained in power an under
standing was impossible*

Germany could only wait until the

Prim© Minister passed from power, and then an bfreement might
be concluded with the other cabinet ministers who wore more
favorable toward an

a l l i a n c e .39

On March 27, Holstein gave a more detailed exposition
on the possibility of a British alliance in a memorandum
dealing with the Far Eastern situation.

At present, he said,

Germany wished to maintain the best relations with Russia
and would, therefore, continue her policy of neutrality in
China.

The opposition of Britain and Japan was sufficient

to stop Russian aggresion.HO

Ha stated:

All would be quite different If England would make up
her mind to link herself at some time with the ?rir.-la
Alliance, and if Japan came in also as a pendant to
England.
In this esse England, who both. lr: Asia and
Europe is genuinely for a defensive policy, would serve
as a counterweight to Japanfs restlessness; but even If
not, that new alliance would be so strong that the
feelings of the other Powers would become lees important
to us than at this moment, when it is advisable to let
Japan go her own way, even in company id th England.
The
Japanese would reply to any German attempt at a
rapprochement by asking if we would help them to enter
Korea or get the Russians out of Manchuria.
On this
basis no understanding would be possible.
As far as Holstein was concerned, these were the terms upon
which an alliance was possible.

Buelow agreed completely

3 % c& ar date in, Krlnnerungen, II, 323-2lj.
^ G . P., XVII, 3^0-51 •Dugdale, German Diplomatic,
III, lUO-HT. ~
--------
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with Holstein’s views and had his memorandum dispatched to
all the major German Kr-ibass5.es as a statement of German pol
icy in the Far East and on the alliance quest ion.

The Chan

cellor commented on the Tortragencler F a t Ts memorandum, n 1For
Baron von Holstein.

Many thanks for this masterly memorandum,

with the conclueions of which

agree at all po5nts. 1M*!^

At the ©nd of March, while the Germans waited for
further developments in the alliance discussions, the British
cabinet were seriously considering the merits of an alliance.
On March 20, Lansdowne drew up a memorandum based on Eckard
stein fs offer of an understanding with Germany.

He circu

lated the memorandum among the cabinet ministers, who were
generally in favor of an agreement but who also expressed
apprehension over the indefinite and f a r - r e a d l u g character
of the proposal.

The British felt that before the n egotia-

tlons continued, if at all, more precis© information was
needed concerning the multi-contingencies involved in such
an agre©ment.^-3
Lansdowne returned to the alliance question on
March 29*^

During his conversation with Eckardstein h©

^ D u g d a l e , German Diplomatic, X U ,
XVII, 351.
W

b

1.UC-M.

3 • P.,
~ ~

. D . , II, 62, 61*.

Wilbld., 62, 6U-65.
Between March 16, 1901, when the alliance was of
fered, and March 29, 1901, Eckardstein reported many conver
sations concerning th© alliance, but Lansdowne only recorded
one other meeting of which he did not relate what was discussed.
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suggested that the alliance discussions be postponed for a
time.

He had made very little progress on the question

since March 13, as Salisbury was ill and unable to discuss
the matter.

Lansdowne was also aware of Salisbury’s oppo

sition to an alliance and was reluctant to discuss the matter
with Eckardstein until he had consulted the Prime Minister*
Eckardstein agreed to postpone the alliance discus
sions*

He accepted the illness of Salisbury as a valid ex

cuse for delaying the negotiations and told Lansdowne that
there was currently a strong anti-British attitude in Berlin
and that the sentiment of the Helenstag was not favorable
toward the British.

As ho was going to Berlin, It was best

to delay the discussions until after the Easter holidays*U5
Eckardstein informed the German Foreign Office that the Brit
ish had postponed th© alliance discussions, but ho did not
give as a reason the objections of Lansdowne.

He said that

the interference of Berlin by sending the Stuobel mission to
London had caused th© British to postpone the discussion of
an a l l i a n c e . ^
To a certain extent, Eckardstein was correct in
blaming th© postponement of the alliance negotiations on
Berlin's sending of the Stuebel mission*

The special mis

sion had beon sont in late March because of a report by
Wlbid.,

62.

s-Gkeka^dsfcein, l.n i'egra. pp. 20V-210.
stein, BrInnerungen, II, 2 88-90'."

tokard-
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Count von Waldersee, who had stated that the British were
hindering a quick solution to the Chinese indemnity question
and the general problems in the Far T n s t A c t i n g

on the

basis of Valdernee1s report, Buelow and the raiser, who was
apparently unaware of the alliance negotiations

sent to

London Or. Oskar Stuebel, Head of th© Colonial Department,
to obtain a quick settlement of the Chinese indemnity ques
tion and the claims of German citizens for losses suffered
in the South African W a r H o l s t e i n

was not In favor of

the Stuebel mission, but he told Eckardstein that at the
time th© success of the Stuebel mission was more important
than the alliance question, particularly for the Kaiser and
Buelow#
The Stuebel mission failed and, as Eckardstein
stated, strained Anglo-German relations at the important
moment when an alliance was under consideration#51

The B r i t 

ish were highly displeased with Germany for raising th© in
demnity and South African claims questions.

They were p a r 

ticularly annoyed at Germanyfs failure to notify them that a
k^Ibid#, II, 209-90#

Eckardstein, Ten Years,

b BG. P., XVII, 50*51.
~ ~

Ritter, Legend©, pp. 27 - 2 8 ,

p. 212#
32.

^ £ L # L *» XVII, lGC-lCln.
For inf ormation or the
St u e b e l mission see G. P_., XVI, 392-Jj.OO.
^Ojijckardstein, Srinnerungen, II, 292.
^ 1Ibld., II, 239-92.
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mission was being sent and when the more important issue of
a war in the Far East was

t h r e a t e n i n g . 5^

Eckardstein claimed

that the British dissatisfaction over the Stuebel mission
prevented the conclusion of an alliance when all that was
necessary for an understanding was the signing of the agree
ment*

He definitely had exaggerated the extent to which the

negotiations had developed, but he was sincere in his con
demnation of th© Berlin Foreign Office for sending Stuebel
to London.

In fact Eckardstein was so disturbed by Berlinfs

action that he submitted his resignation, which was not ac
cepted.^

He probably submitted his resignation in fear

that Dr. 3 tuobe1 and Berlin would discover his unorthodox
role in the alliance discussions, and his fear of discovery
was possibly a reason for his willingness to postpone the
alliance discussions on March
During April one of the K a i s e r ’s outbursts against
th© British further hindered th© possibility of an alliance
and worsened Anglo-German relations.

Eckardstein had re

ported that one of the British cabinet ministers felt Ger
many was untrustworthy as she constantly sought Russia’s
friendship.

This accusation, the failure of the Stuebel

^ Holstein Papers* IV, 222-23.
53Eckardstein, Er inn©rungen* II, 286-92.
stein, Ten Years* pp. 211-14...
Changer,

Diplomacy* II, 73^*
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mission, and Britain's refusal to oppose Russian aggression
in the Par East led the Kaiser to refer to the British cab
inet ministers as "unmitigated noodles•"

The British

learned of the Kaiser's accusation, and the result was a
further strain in Anglo-Norman relations.

Th© incident, as

well as the Stuebel mission, might have been avoided if the
Kaiser had been informed that an alliance had been under
serious consideration.55
Th© Kaiser's displeasure with Britain resulted, in
part, from his dissatisfaction over British policy in the Par
East.

Th© British had continued to refrain from any action

In spit® of reports of an agreement between Russia and China
over Manchuria.

Britain appeared content to allow the Jap

anese to halt the Russian

by sending repeated threats that

force would be employed unless Russia repudiated the Manchu

rian agreement.

Finally on April

Russia notified the pow

ers that she was no longer considering an agreement with

China

Germany had hoped that Britain might unite with

Japan and become involved in a Far Eastern conflict against
In such a case Britain might have had to seek German

Russia.

assistance and possibly in the form of an alliance.

British

laxity in acting and th© Russian announcement prevented such
a situation from developing and lessened th© tension in th©
^Eckardstein,
XVII,
60-65.
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Far Fast, 57

but these events had little affect in discour

aging Lckarustein from continuing to seek ar3 Anglo-German
alliance.'
In early April, 1901, Holstein returned to the ques
tion of a British alliance.

He informed Eckardstein that

when the alii ance negotiations resummed there were two major
points that must be agreed upon before an agreement could be
c o n d uc ed.

If any member of the proposed alliance suffered

attack by two or more powers, the remaining 'powers must come
to its

aid.

finally, the negotiations were bo be con-

uucted through Vienna, thereby gaining the support of public
opinion for an alliance.

He felt public opinion had to be

considered in this matter and stated that if th© alliance
discussions were to succeed it was on the above terns,

Hol

stein also warned that any further4 postponement and delay was
not desirable*5^

Eckardstein replied to Holstein's dispatch that bansdowne would probably raise the question of an alliance at
any time.

The reason why discussion had not resumed was b e 

cause the British distrusted Germany, but Eckardstein added
that with time th© distrust would be removed and negotiations
would

r e s u m e . 60

Eckardstein met with Lansdowne on April 9,

D . , 1, 332.

^Langer,

diplomacy, II, 727.

^hok&rdstein, hr inn c.run gen, II, 331 •
6 oIbid., II, 333-37.
Eckardstein , ¥en Years, p. 21lj •

G. p., x v n ,

50-51.

srtd told the British Foreign Secretary that the time had come
to resume the alliance negotiations.

Lansdowne replied that

such an important question was Impossible of dl scvsn?or un
til Salisbury returned to Britain fron his tr'a to the South
of France.^1

The Prime Minister res not scheduled to return

until Fay 10.^2
Eckardstein ago In talked with Lans cl.05.me on April 13*
The British Foreign Secretory told '“’ekardste!n that he would
not discuss an alliance until the brine Minister returned.
Eckardstein ther reminded Lansdowne that the alliance dl seu r s I on s were unof.fi cial and that Falser ”1Xhelm TT men rot
•arere of the details of the regotl s tl or s «

Lansdowne asked

lost how far was the Falser aware of the discussions?

Fckard-

stein replied, after he "hummed and ha* d a great deal", said
Lansdowne, that the ideas so far expressed agreed, with the
Kaiser's opinions as judged by individuals close to Filhelm II.
Eckardstein gave Holstein as an e.r&rple , and apparently,
Lansdowne had never heard of him.^3
Eckardsteinfs report is almost a complete contradic
tion of Lansdowne* s version of the April 13> meeting.

Fck-

ardstein said that Chamberlain, Lansdowne, and Devonshire
all desired an alliance and that even Salisbury would prob
ably favor an agreement.

"Times have changed,” he said, and

61b. p., TT, 62-63.

62s. P.. -VI1, 5!jn.

».
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the discussions would nos^ibly resume ner:t wee1^.
th© initial of**er of an ©1 llance on f'nrch 1 %

Hot sine©

had Hcknrd-

stain reported such an optimistic turn In the negotiations#^
Lansdowne, however, reported that "he h a d refused to discuss
the subject and stated that he had .orown quite skeotiesl of
hckardsteln1s repeated attempts to ronow the alliance nego
tiations#

He stated that much of what Eckardstein said was

not authorised#

In fact, he believed, Eckardsteinfs views

"jSS 3QT) prop re er u *ft

‘The British Foreign S e c r e t a r y also

expressed grave doubts that anything would result from the
negotiations#

In principle, he felt, an alliance was a good

idea, Mbut when each side comes, if it ever does, to formu
late its terms, we shall break down; and I know Lord Salis
bury regards the scheme with, to say the least, suspicS o n •n65
As a result of Eckardstein1s reporting,Holstein woe
under the impression that the discussions were progressing*
H© telegrsohed Kokar&stein reemrhast zing and explaining why
the negotiations must proceed through Vienna#

Holstein said

that th© discussions must be held in Vienna in order to dis
pel th© Austrian apprehensions, *diich resulted from th©

en

emies of the Triple Alliance proclaiming that Germany planned
th© partition of th© Austrian Empire#

The Austrians were to

6-4Eckard31c5r , '"'rinnerungen, II, 13-•
Height of Power, IV, l£g~.
65 b .

d .,

II, 63-6!)..
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have a leading role 1r th-:- nsgoti at long In ordrr to roagsurt
Austria1a friendship.

Eckardstein, as in marg* urevlaus Infr

stances, failed to .follow Holstein’s advice. D
On April 1 %

Eckardstein reported that both Britain

and Japan showed a growing interest In a far Has tern agree
ment with Germany.
anese,^

This was particularly true of the Jap-

In reply to Eckardstein*s report Holstein warned

that such an agreement was against the interests of Germany.
If the three cowers concluded such an understanding, which
was certainly the desire of Britain and Japan, there would
no longer €>xlst any inducement for the British to join the
Triple Alliance.

It was Britain’s isolationist position in

the Bar East that would force her to conclude an alliance
with Germany.

Eckardstein was to refrain from encouraging

the Javanese that a

Fas torn agreement was possible until

the conclusion of a defensive alliance with Britain.
By late April or early Kay, the Berman Foreign Office
realized that the negotiations were not progressing.
bury was still out of the country.

Salis

Lansdowne had been ab

sent from London for seme time, and a brief illness kept him
from any work at the Foreign Office.

■3-. P., XVII, 53. •
in,

ikb*

^Eckardstein,

Ougdale, German Diplomatic,
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^ % b i & . , p. 219•
32*1-14 2 .

Eckardstein had also
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journeyed to Berlin*

Since no progress seemed possible,

Germen policy was to continue to wait until the British re
turned to the subject of an alliance and avert any incidents
that might strain relations between London and Berlin.^9
With Salisbury’s return to Britain on Kay 10, the
German Foreign Office sent elaborate instructions to London
in preparation for the resumption of the alliance discussions*
Buelow1s instructions were very similar to those of Holstein
The only difference was that bolstein favored an agreement
more than Buelow.
Holstein stated th© German policy on an alliance
with Britain in a long, detailed, and hypothetically argued
memorandum.

He said that British adhesion to the Triple Al

liance would create such a strong alignment cf powers that
peace would be assured or success in the case; of any war.
Such an alliance required, that, if any signer cf the pro
posed agreement was attacked by two or more powers, the re
maining powers, who were party to the agreement, would a id
the attacked power.

Under such coucltions, neither the Ger

man nor the British parllancntnry bodies coy la object as
both Germany and Britain were assured of support in case of
an attack.

These terms would remove the fear that either

Britain or Geincny would fall to grant support and remove
69Holstsln Papers . r.', ZZ1-21?.
70q. P., XVI, Lt?6-27.
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Anglo-German distrust#

An An*rlo-German s sre mon t, Holstein

stated, was impossible since it mfcht increase Austrian dis
trust of Germany.

In fact the rmgeti at1one mist proceed

through Vienna in order to dispel the Austrian fear that
Germany planned the partition of the Hapaburg Monarchy fol
lowing the death of Fmperor Francis «Tosenh#

By going through

Vienna, Holstein said, neither Germany nor Britain would, have
to fear that any information would ness to the Hussions,
fhese were the only ter ns for an agreement and must not be
varied from, in any wav#71
Bokardsteln reported on hay 1 5 , that he had. dis
cussed. an alliance vi th

L a n s d o w n e #

72

He said that Salisbury

had agreed, at least in principle, with the cabinet minis
ters in favoring a defensive alliance with Germany, but men
tioned that the Prime Minister had objections to th© Inclu
sion of Austria and Italy in th© a r r a n g e m e n t #73

71

Salisbury

Eckardstein, Krinrerunger , IT, 3L<L|-1j 7*

72ffhere is no record of this conversation In the B. D.
U p . Q. , II, 6!l-65;.
Bckardstein had been informed to tell the British
that the agreement was to be between Britain and the '"Ik*Iole
Alliance and not solely with Germany.
Eckardstein di d not
specifically state when he informed Britain of the stipula
tion nor does th© B. J. Indicate.
Lansdowno* 3 first refer
ence to the sti pulatton
made on v ay F t • It appears that
between March £9, when the negotiations were te KipOFfii'i 1 y
postponed, erd May ?3i Fckar*d.stcin informed the British that
the alliance was to include Italy and Austria#
Since Lans
downe did not record this conversation, it sesms more than
likely that the B . Dm do not contain the complete documents
of tbs 1901 sllt*aree question or that the meeting never took
place#

Ill
felt that th© addition of Austria and Italy complicated a
probable treaty.

For example, what would be the responsi

bilities of Britain In case Italy and Austria suffered attack?
Britain must know definitely her responsibilities if such
questions arose in Parliament,

Th© Prim© Minister particu

larly disliked the idea of uniting with th© rather weak
Slavic state of Austria and the Latin on© of Italy,

Lans

downe, reported Eckardstein, expressed confidence that Salis
b u r y 1s objections could be overcome and that the time had
arrived to put th© terms in a written form,?4

Th© terms

would then be discussed point by point, but as before th©
discussions were to be of a purely academic nature with no
binding obligations,

Eckardstein also remarked that th© time

was still not appropriate to suggest transferring th© nego
tiations to Vienna,*^
Hatzfeldt reported in a separate and later dispatch
that he was highly skeptical of Britain1s supposed willing
ness to conclude an agreement.

It was particularly doubtful

that Salisbury favored an alliance and even more doubtful
that Lansdowne could persuade the Prim© Minister to accept
7^The views reflected by Eckardstein as those of the
British and particularly of Salisbury seem highly distorted,
if not false.
The British were not so favorable as indi
cated nor had the discussions developed to that extent,
Langer, Diplomacy, II, 732,
75|>ugdal©, German Diplomatic, III, ll|5-46,
XVII, 57-60,
Eckardstein, Er1nnerungen, II, 349,

G* P,,
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the Idea,

Since neither he nor Eckardstein had discussed an

alliance with Salisbury, it was too early and too dangerous
to consider putting any views in a written form.
cussions had not progressed to that extent,

The dis

Hatzfeldt said

that Germany should not push the discussions but wait until
th© British acted, since rushing the negotiations would only
create d i s t r u s t , ^
Holstein and the Foreign Office agreed with Hatzfeldt,
As Holstein stated there was no merit In discussing detailed
questions and putting any ideas on paper until Britain agreed
to join the Triple Alliance,

An Anglo-German agreement, he

said, was not desirable since such an understanding failed
to provide Germany with protection.

For example if Austria

and Italy were not Included in the alliance and Germany
aided her Triple Alliance partners in a war, Britain might
state that she was not required to support Germany when the
latter was obligated to the Triple Alliance,

British adhe

sion to th© Triple Alliance would also assure peace since
the other powers would not risk a war for fear of fighting
both Britain and th© Triple Alliance,

Once Britain realized

this fact and consented to join th© Triple Alliance, Germany
would agree to put matters on paper.

As to Salisbury’s ob

jections, Holstein said, he was merely trying to avoid any
definite obligations,

German policy was to continue to wait

76G. P., XVII, 63-6U.

113
until Britain returned to the subject and agreed to accept
the German terms,

Holstein warned that the British were not

to be rushed or pushed unnecessarily,^
Th© alliance discussions resumed on May 20,76

Lans

downe met with Hatzfeldt, who had recovered from an illness
which had prevented him from meeting with the British Foreign
Secretary since early in January,

During their brief dis

cussion they planned a meeting for May 23, at which time
they would discuss the alliance q u e s t i o n , Eckardstein, at
this time, was not in London and was unaware of the scheduled
meeting, until he returned to the Foreign Office on May 22,
On that same day Eckardstein, having found out about Hatzfel&t’s planned meeting with Lansdowne, discussed the possi
bility of an alliance with the British Foreign Secretary*
Immediately following their meeting, Eckardstein met with
Hatzfeldt and attempted to persuade the Ambassador not to
meet with Lansdowne on the next day,

Eckardstein offered

three times to write a note to Lansdowne explaining why the
Ambassador would be unable to meet him, but Hatzfeldt r e 
fused,

Eckardstein probably feared that Hatzfeldt would

discover his unauthorized role in offering and discussing an
77Ibl d.. 60-65.
7h_bld. , 63-61)..

Eckardstein, ErinnerunRen, II,

350.
7% .

255-57.

D., II, 71-72, 76-79.

Holstein Papers, IV,

alliance.
On Hay 23, Eckardstein telegraphed Holstein the sub
ject of M s

May 22, meeting with Lansdowne*

In the most

optimistic tones Eckardstein stated that the alliance dis
cussions had resumed and that Britain had accepted the Ger
man t e r m for an alliance.

Even Salisbury recognized that

”splendid Isolation** was no longer possible and only objected
to an alliance on minor points, which could easily be over
come*

Eckardstein concluded by asserting that he had ar

ranged th© May 23, meeting between Lansdowne and Hatzfeldt
Holstein’s reaction to Eckardstein1s report was one of skep
ticism that Salisbury had agreed to an alliance,®^
Th© most important discussion of the 1901 alliance
negotiations took place on Fay 23, between Hatzfeldt and
Lansdowne*

The Ambassador, as a result of Eckardstein*s re

porting, was under the impression that Britain had practi
cally agreed to an alliance and that they were avrar© of th©
Goman

alliance terms•

peated the German terms,

Hatzfeldt,

therefore, merely re

Th© alliance was to be between

Britain and the Triple Alliance with the casus foederis
arising when any one signer of the agreement was attacked by
8°Ibld., 225-26.
Eckardstein, Srlnnerungen. II, 351-52.
stoln, Ten Years, pp* 219-26•
82G. P., XVII, 67n. -***.
83Holateln Papers. IV, 225-26.
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two or more powers.

Public opinion, stated Hatzfeldt, pre

vented an agreement which would fail
Austria and Italy.

bo insure support to

The basis of German policy was to support

Austria, and, if this had not been the case, Germany could
have easily come to terms with Russia.

It was only th©

Austro-Russian conflict of interests that prevented a RussoGerman agreement.

At the present time, Hatzfeldt said, un

less Britain agreed to join the Triple Alliance, it was use
less to discuss th© more detailed questions of such an agree
ment *^4
Hatzfeldt had stated that the agreement was to be

solely with the Triple Alliance.

Lord Lansdowne was some

what shocked at H a t z f e l d t 1a statement since he was under th©

impression that the proposed agreement was not necessarily
between the powers of the ‘Triple Alliance and Great Britain.
Lansdowne " told Count Hatzfeldt that this proposal seemed • ••
to go further than maything which we had yet discussed.
Eckardstein, hansdown© said, had earlier informed him that
Austria and Italy were to ba included In an agreement, but
he had not explained that Britain was merely to join the
Triple Alliance.

The British Foreign Secretary said that,

if Britain was to join the ‘
Triple Alliance,

to know the terms of that agreement.
8,ki. P., XVII, 65-67.
8% b i d . ,

80.

she would need

Hatzfeldt replied that

B. D. , II, 611.-65.
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there

was

nothing mysterious about the terms of the Triple

Alliance«
Hatzfeldt1s proposal, Lansdowne felt, would make It
difficult to clearly distinguish when on© of the parties to
the agreement was attacked or merely defending itself*

The

implication was that each of the parties to the agreement
possessed the right to determine the foreign policy of the
other party.

Th© British could not accept such terms as

public opinion would not accept such a limitation upon her
liberty of action*

The many objections of Lord Salisbury

also prevented the possibility of such an agreement, but
Lansdowne told Hatzfeldt that he would submit the proposal
to the Prim© Minister and cabinet
On the day following the May 23

meeting Lansdowne

sent a note to Fekardstein requesting a ’
p romised memorandum*
On May 22, Eckardstein had promised the British Foreign
Secretary, without the sanction of the Berlin Foreign Office,
a memorandum, containing the detailed alliance terms of the
AA
Germans*00

Eckardstein received Lanadowne's request, but

as he was leaving London he gave Lansdowne ?s note to Hatzfeldt*^

‘
"Tie Ambassador was completely ignorant that such a

d6Ibld., 6Ij.-65, 80 - 83 .
67b .

p

Ritter, Legende. p. 37.

., It, 66.

38I M d .. IX, 69-70.
892* £•» II* 70.

Holstein Papers. IV, 225-26.
Holateln Papers. IV, 225-26.
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document had beer promised and Informed Lansdowne that he
!mew nothing about such a document and that, until he talked
with Eckardstein, he was unable to supply any Information on
the na 11 e r •
Hatzfeldt telegraphed. the Foreign OffI.ce about his
May 23, meeting and. informed only Holstein of Lansdownefr
request for Fcknrdsteln1s promised m e m o r a n d u m * ^

He told

Holstein that Eckardstein had definitely gone beyond Berlinfs
instructions*and. was intriguing against him in hope of re
placing him as Ambassador.^2
In the meantime Eckardstein had learned what had
passed at the May 23, meeting and spread the -rumor that
Hatzfeldt had gone beyond Berlin*3 instructions in the nego
tiate oro with LanodouTie.
B

e

r

l

i

n

Eckardstein even made a trip to

ancj informed Holstein and other officials that

the old end mentally weak Ambassador was unfit for his post*^4Hcraarkable as It may seem, Holstein believed Eckardstein in
stead of his life-long friend. Count Hatzfeldt.

In a letter

to the Ambassador, Holstein answered Hatzfeldt*s charge that
90 B. D., II, 70.

91G. P., XVII, 65-67n. ***.

92Hol stein Papers. IV, 225-37.
93 i b t d . .

21.

231-31+•

91ttbid., 225-31+.
Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 220Eckardstein, Erlnnerungen» II, 299-3^0•
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Eckardstein was intriguing against him*

He said:

Everything I know of his /^ckardstein7 activities tends
to show that he wants to help you. *ftius during the long
time when you were completely out action, he did not say
a single word about your condition in the Ministry here,
not even to me
had he, /?■c k ar d stcirj not been present, tbr. Kaiser would
by now have sent someone else to London to uake over
I^must warn you most definitely against breaking with
^ITckardsteln/
Ilia Majesty, and I . . • also the Chancellor, regard
f \ i - c

k r stei
f

6

n

j

as the r.tccesary official complement in

view of your physical immobility.^!?
As a result of Hatzfeldt’s age and illness, Holstein also
believed that the Ambassador had "summoned Lord Lansdown© to
come to terms with Germany at the May 23 meeting.*1^

Bckard-

stein had also informed Lansdown© that Hatzfeldt had gone
beyond his instructions on May 2 3 * ^

Lansdown©, acting on

the basis of Eckardstein fs information, believed that Hatzfeldt had "pushed matters rather too far and too

f a s t " 9 8

and

"that Hatzfeldt *s Intervention had led to a good deal of
misunderstanding, and that he must have represented my con
versation with him as indicating much more alacrity on our
part than w© have actually exhibited.11^

The result of

95>Eolstein l a p e r a , 17, 227-23.
> ^5*
ilolstola Papers. IV, 23-i*3*~•
Eckardstein, Srlnne run seen, III

9?B. D., II, B7.
"ibid.,

70.

98Ibld., 31.
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Eckardstein1s intrigue100 was that Count Hatzfeldt was even
tually removed from his post as Ambassador to Great Brit
ain.10*
While Eckardstein conducted his intrigue $ Hatzfeldt
requested Berlin for instructions on the alliance negotia
tions.

ho Is te in informed the Ambassador that Germany vras un

able to provide Lansdown© with the terms of the Triple Alli
ance and that to avoid any Indiscretion nothing was to ap
pear in writing before Britain agreed* at least in principle,
to the German terms*

He then repeated the terms of an alli

ance and his earlier instructions#10^

As to the British

request for Eckardstein !s promised memorandum, Holstein tel
egraphed that
there can be no question of a written memorandum for the
present, that is, not until we are agreed on the basic
principles. You would have to he specifically empowered
from here before such a memorandum could be handed
over.^°5
On May 2o, Lansdown© sent Hatzfeldt a second request for th©
promised memorandum of Eekardsfcein as well as the terms of
the Triple Alliance.

The apprehensive Ambassador immediately

10°For one of the most scholarly and detailed treat
ments of Eckardstein *a Intrigue against Hatzfeldt see Hein
rich Freiherr von Hoyningen genannt Huene, Unterauchungen
zur Qesohlchte des Due t a ch-Snglla chon Buendni ap r ob 1 ems , 139Bl^Sl lBreslau^ T95UT,"' ppY ~12cJn* !*.'%]. Hereafter cited" '
as
ifueri©, XJntersuchungen*
10lHoXateln Papers, IV, 229-32.

102a. P., XVII, 67-S3.
103Holateln Papers, IV, 227-28.
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Informed Berlin of tiansdowne’s r e q u e s t ^ ^ end asked for in
structions os to what he was to tell Lansdowne concerning
the promised memorandum and if he raised the question of an
alliance.

Hatzfeldt warned that if the problem was not handled

with care there was a likelihood of alienating the British.*^
Holstein telegraphed the Ambassador on F&y 29# that
when the first written document in the alliance question
leaves our hand, the first formal suggestion of sn alii*
ance cones from us— exactly what ve wish to avoid. To
decide on the principle whether an attack on the Triple
Alliance should raise the casus foederis for Bngland,
the Lnglish require nothing in writing.
When England
has expressed herself on the principle, written notes,
for Instance on the meaning of the word attack, can be
exchanged.
Till then, in my opinion, we should give
nothing in w r i tin g.^ *
He added tliat, if Britain failed tc agree to the general
principles of an alliance, Germany would have no proof that
the intent’ons of the British were serious•
exception.

There was an

If Lansdowns requested information on certain

points, which indicated clearly that the Initiative came
from Britain, then possibly Germany would supply the infor
mation requested*
Hatzfeldt agreed with Holstein that the two govern
ments should not put anything in writing or* that Germany
should supply 'Laos do vine with the promised m cm or andiui, but he
10^G. P., XVII, 68-70.

B. D . , II, 70-71.

iO^O. P., XVII, 7 0 .

^ hfeld.
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felt that

it was necessary to

terest in

an alliance.

lieved that,
ciples of

assure Britain1®continued in

Like Holstein, the Ambassador be

if and when both countries agreed

an alliance,

then adocument similar

to the Prin
to T?cknrd-

stein*a promised neporandim conl.i he exchanged and would be
useful,^®

Tn the meantime Hatzfeldt raid he would not men

tion an alliance until the British had, and then the conver
sations would remain academic as in the
While the Germans waited for the alliance discussions
to resume the British were seriously considering the Gorman
terms for an alliance,

following th® May

23

$ meeting, T.ans-

down© drew up a memorandum on the history of the 1901 alli
ance negotiations#

He submitted the memorandum to Salis

bury and the e a b i n e t ^ ^ and directed Under-Secretary, T. H#
Sanderson to draft a treaty based on the German terms#
Sanderson drew up two slightly different and incomplete
treaties.

He stated that it was difficult to draft any de

tailed or complete treaty without full knowledge of th©
terms#

This may have bean th© reason for Lansdown©* s anxious

request for the terms of the Triple Alliance and for Kckardstein*s promised memorandum*

Sanderson felt that Britain

would gain little from such an alliance, but his opposition
to an understanding was not as strong as that of Lord
loeibld., 72.
109 g .
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Galinbury.
The Prime Minister reviewed the German alliance
terms and drew up a masterly memorandum in which he main
tained his traditional position of opposition to any alli
ance.

Saila bury s t at e d :

It Is open to much question whether the bargain would be
for our advantage.
The liability of having to defend the
German and Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier
than that of having to defen 3 the 7r1 tlsh Iales sralnat
France • • • in its most naked aspect' the bargain won T d
be a ‘
bad one for this country.
As to th c threat of Er i ti &h isolati on , 1 alls bury ar :-;;u©d on
the basis of historical precedent •

Britain- could only be

saved by control of the Channel and th e seas, and never in
her past h a C any power beer; able to protect or old the Is
land, nor was such protect5 on ever really necessary.
tion, he felt, was no great danger.

Isola

lie questioned:

have we c.ver felt tfiat d.crpor practlcall?? • • . It Is
TmpossTbTeTTor us Fo Judge whether tKe WIsola11 on" un
der which we arc supposed to suffer, does or does not
contain in it any elements of peril.
It would hardly
be wise to Incur novel and most onerous obligati, ora, in
order to guard against a danger in whose existence we
have r.c hi atopical reason for TeirevT"."lT3— -------Th© Prime Minister stated that an alliance was Impossible
because of ore importer! fact.

In case of wav, Salisbury

said’
The English Government . . . must o.epend on the view
taken bp public opinion in this country, and nubile

, 66-6G.
^hbld.

, fX 9
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opinion wonId be largely, if not exclusively, governed
by the nature of the easua belli*^^4Aa far as ohe British were concerned, the opposition of

Salisbury ended any prospect of concluding an alliance based
upon th© German terms
Before Lansdown© informed the Germans of Sail©bury*s
negative attitude, Eckardstein met with the Foreign Secretary
and postponed the alliance discussions*

EekardsteJr remarked

that since Hatzfeldt had gone beyond bis instructions on
May 2.3, that it was best to postpone any further discussion
until a more opportune time*

Lansdown© agreed and waited

lor the Germans to resume the negotiat ion s*^ ^
On June, ?', Lansdown© met with Hatzfeldt, but an
alliance was not discussed*

The meeting with Lansdowne was

the last one for Hatzfeldt, who was soon to be removed from
his post*

The British Foreign Secretary felt that since

Hatzfeldt was leaving any discussion of an alliance would be
of littl© value•

The Ambassador held a similar opinion*

He believed that, since Lansdowne had not raised the subject
of an alliance, he would probably not do so In the f u t u r e * ^ ®
lli4.jb.1d *, 69*
^^•^Ibid*, 66-69.

Dreyer,

Deutschland* pp. 88- 89.

116B. D., II, 71-72, 76-77, -0-83, 87-88.
117lbid., 71-72.
Papers, IV, 229—31*
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The British Foreign Secretory stated that he wan
quite cor tent to mark time for a while*
I doubt whether
it will be poss ible to make anything of what for con
venience sake T would describe as *-he '"ok«- rdalelr rmoposal, and if we are to consider some alternative form
of agreement, perhaps limited to rerticil^r eventual-

Inuring June, Eckardstein attempted to resume the
negotiations, but Lansdowne refused saying that the members
of the cabinet were too involved with parliamentary matters*
He said that consideration of such a *'mom©ntuous,i question
would have to wait until later*

The British and the Ger

man Foreign Office continued to wait for the other to resume
the alliance discussions, but neither took the

i n i t i a t i v e * ^ ^ !

Holstein and the Germans were confident that the British
would eventually seek an alliance with

G e r m a n y

.^22

^8jj,* A>. , 11, 71-72*
^20b# b * , II, CO-0I4.*

Holstein tapers» IV, 231-32*

X£1Ibld.. 71-72, 8O-83, 76-79, 69.
X22G. P., XVII, 72, 71+.
p* U& 9*

G. P., XVII, 68f.

Gooch, Holstein Oracle,

CHAPTER V
FRIEDRICH VON HOLSTEIN AND THE FINAL PHAHE
OF THE 1901 ATTTTPT AT AN ALLIANCE
On June 12, Holstein reviewed the alliance discus
sions In a detailed and lengthy memorandum.

After discus

sing the alliance negotiations of 1887, Holstein commented
on the nature of British foreign policy*^

He stated!

British policy, Indeed, rested on the conviction that a
continental struggle was inevitable, and that Great Brit
ain would profit by a conflict in which she took no part*
In other words it was the business of other Powers to
pull th© chestnuts out of the fir© for her*
This catspaw
theory, Which has gradually become a fetish for a certain
school of English politicians, is beyond doubt th© cause
of th© universal hatred of England to-day*
Ho one likes
being duped, and the people of th© Continent have grad
ually reached the conviction that England is out to dupe
them. Salisbury has carried out this policy more openly
than any of his predecessors*2
Following an attack on the British Prim© Minister, Holstein
continued by reviewing Anglo-German relations*

He said that

since the meeting at Cowes in lS9? the two nations relations
had deteriorated until th© relationship was dominated by mis
trust.

The only satisfactory result of the past association

between th© two governments was th© tenuous merit that arose
from agreements over particular questions.

Further limited

*G. p., XVII, 83- 8 8 .
2Ib 1d .

Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 1(66.
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agreements were Impossible, he felt, because such agreements
failed to bring Germany any significant compensation#
Holstein continued by tracing the alliance negotia
tions since I89S and reiterated the German terms for an al
liance In 1901*3

He stated :

If we assume the Immense burden and responsibility of
defending the British Empire, with all its colonies
against all comers, the Triple Alliance must be regarded
as a whole, just like the British Empire, so that for
instance an attack on Austria or Italy by two or more
Powers would call not only the members of the Triplice
but also England into th© field#
An alliance of England
with Germany alone would make the position of the latter
worse instead of better.
For since the contents of the
treaty would be published, her opoonents would know that
if they attack Austria, and Germany goes to her assist
ance, England will take no part#
But th© inclination to
fight with Germany would be greatly enhanced when it was
known that In certain eventualities she is pledged to
support Great Britain#
At present w© feel strong enough
not to hurry In the search for support# Moreover we be
lieve that the current of events will probably one day
bring Germany and England together#
In times of excite
ment we have avoided building dams which would impede
the flow of the stream, and we will retain our freedom
as long as we can*^
Holstein felt that there would be a definite advant
age gained from transferring the negotiations to Vienna#

The

Austrian fear that Germany planned th© partition of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire would be removed, and such a trans
fer would lessen Anglo-German distrust#

Negotiating in

Vienna, he felt, would have the support of public opinion in
both Germany and Britain#
3g .

p

He concluded that future alliance

., xvix, 33-83.

hbld.

Qooch, Holstein Oracle, p. I467.
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discussions must b© conducted in Vienna, even if Salisbury
opposed th© Idea.

In th© memorandum Holstein had stated

th© German terms for an agreement and reaffirmed Germany*s
policy of waiting until th© British returned to the alliance
question
Not until July did Eckardstein report that the Brit
ish had

©gain expressed an interest In discussions with Ger

many, but it was for a limited understanding over the growing
problem of Morocco.^

In January Eckardstein had reported

that Chamberlain had favored a limited agreement over Morocco,
which might possibly lead to an alliance, but the Berlin
Foreign Office had disregarded the Idea.7

By July th© af

fairs In Morocco had worsened and the Sultan of Morocco,
Abdel Aziz, had claimed that Franc© planned aggressive actions
against his sultanate.

After the request of Abdel Aziz for

support, Britain sought to discover the attitude of Germany
on the question.

According to Eckardstein, th© British de

sired to conclude an agreement with Germany over Morocco
Th© German Foreign Office responded to Eckardstein*s
report

by declaring German policy in Morocco to b© the main

tenance of th© status q u o # ^
%•
2^8.

As Buelow stated, lfIn this

JP./XVII, 83-88.

6Ibid., 333n. **.
Eekardateln, Erlnnerungen. II,
Eckardstein, Ten Yea r s , pp. 22l\.-2^~.
?Ibld.

“Anderson, Morocco, pp. 11-15•

9G. P., XVII, 332-33. 333-39.
10Ibld.. 92-93, 339-U2.
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matter we must for the time being maintain complete reserve
and act the part of the sphinx"*^

Holstein echoed these

sentiments by stating that, as long as the position of the
powers remained unchanged, Germany policy was to refrain
from any action.

Such a policy, he felt, agreed with the

British view as they as well as the French had no desir© to
push the 1 s s u e . ^

Morocco was not important enough for Ger

many to risk a war over by concluding a limited agreement with
Britain.^3

The negative attitude of Holstein and the Berlin

Foreign Office prevented Eckardstein from resuming the alli
ance negotiations on the basis of a possible agreement over
Morocco.
By July th© Germans felt that the alliance negotia
tions, which had begun In March were now ended, and that
sometime in the future the British would return to the sub
ject*^

Th© British, at this time, believed that the alli

ance discussions were only postponed and waited for the
German government to resume the n e g o t i ations.^
Eckardstein, during the remaining months of 1901,
failed to achieve the resumption of th© alliance discussions.^
^ Xbld., 333*
J-Sq .

p

.,

x v ii,

Longer, Diplomacy, II, TlpO.
333.

1 3I b l d . .

88.

3-teckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 22[j.-25«
stein, Erinnerungen, I I , '558-68 •
D . , II, 85.
XVII, 100-109.
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16Ibld., 80- 83.
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He was prevented from conducting such independent action by
Count Paul von Ketternich's strict control of the German
Embassy in London*

Metternich refrained from initiating any

independent action and followed Berlin1s instructions on the
alliance q u e s t i o n . ^

Me made no effort to broach the sub

ject of an alliance and waited to receive any British over
tures

but neither the British nor th© Germans renewed the

alliance negotiations•^0
The only reference to an understanding, before the
alliance discussions resumed in December, came in August
during a meeting between the Kaiser and King Edward VII at
Homburg*

In preparation for the meeting Holstein dispatched

instructions to Buslow, who was to inform the Kaiser, as to
German policy*

On the subject of an alliance Holstein ad

vised that Germany should wait until Britain again suggested
an understending,which# in order to be acceptable, required
Britain to join th© Triple Alliance*

If the British made

such an offer, he felt that th© opposition of Salisbury would
prevent an understanding*

Holstein instructed Buelow that

the K a i serrs duty was to preserve friendly relations with th©
British and emphasize BrltainTs need for German supoort.
The Kaiser agreed to follow H o l s t e i n ^ instructions•^1
l6Ibid.

20 I b l d . .

19 b . d . , II, 8U-86.
80-83.

F ., XVII, 92-9’i.
Brandenburg, From Bismarck
World, p* T?0.
Holstein Papers, IV, 235-36*
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The discussion of Wilhelm II and King Edward VII
concerned the foreign policy of th© two governments, and as
a result they referred to the possibility of an alliance*
Both leaders were disappointed that the alliance negotiations
of March and Fay had not resulted in a formal understanding*
The Kaiser was particularly displeased, and his comments may
have damaged the possibility of resuming the negotiations*
King Edward VII and the Hals or concluded the Hamburg meeting
with a repetition of the old cliche for a desire of better
relations and a future alliance**^
Following the Hamburg meeting, Holstein repeated his
views on a British alliance in a lengthy memorandum on Ger
man foreign policy*

He attacked Salisbury asserting that

the Prime Minister vas untrus tworthy a nd des ire d to 1nvolv©
Germany’ in a Continental war*

Since Salisbury had no desire

for an alliance with Germany, Holstein felt, there was no
prospect for the conclusion of an understanding*

Puelow and

Fcttemicfc agreed with Holstein and believed Germany should
continue to seek the friendship of

R u s s i a *^3

In late October and early TTovember Holstein met with
his close friend The Times reporter, Valentine Chirol*

Hol-

^ G . P., XVII, 92-9lj*
Brandenburg, From Bismarck
World, p* T?0T
Sir Sidney Lee, Kln& Edward vj'f", A Biographv (2 vols*; London: Kacmillan~and Co*", l95S-2?T, T,
797-9 8 * Hereafter cited as Lee, King Edward*
2% - ii*» XVII, 98-101, XVIII, Part I, 20-28.
Dugdale, German Diplomatic* III, 155-56*
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stein and Buelow, who also talked with The Times reporter*
hoped to obtain Chirol!s support for an Anglo-German alli
ance.

The Vortra&ender Hat believed that if Chirol would

write articles for The Times supporting an alliance, the
antagonism between the countries would be lessened, if not
removed.
holstein told Chirol that Germany was becoming pow
erful, and this fact reduced Britain's freedom to reject a
German alliance•

If the British failed to realize this fact,

Germany might form a Continental league against Britain; how
ever, Germany favored an Anglo-German understanding, which
would assure the “pacification of lurope,"

Following a

lengthy history of how Britain had caused Germany to distrust
the British, Holstein discussed the 1901 alliance negotia
tions of which Ch5.ro! was completely unaware.

He stated

that an alliance was never really considered as an actual
possibility.

Germany was not in need of such an agreement

as she was on the best of terms with Russia, but the major
obstacle to an understanding had been the opposition of
Salisbury.

As long as the Prime Minister remained in power,

Holstein said, an alliance was Impossible, but he, huelow,
^ N e w t o n , Lansdowne, p. 201 •
Sir Valentine Chirol,
Fifty Years in a Changing World (London:
Jonathan Cape,
19271, pp. 293-96.
Hereafter cited as Chirol, Fifty Years.
Office of The Times, The History of The Times (h. vols.; Lon
don:
The oTficeTHf TEF~TTHl¥7 l 9 3 ? - ^ , n T l T 332.
Here
after cited as History of The Times.
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and the Kaiser believed that tine would gradually bring the
two governments together.
ably be concluded

Such an understanding would prob

afterhe had passed from power,

felt that for thepresent, "All that could
leave

Holstein

be done was to

the future open *
In a subsequent memorandum Holstein developed his

Ideas further and reviewed the terms of a British alliance.
Hie British were to join the Triple Alliance with the agree
ment coming Into effect when one of the parties to the under
standing was attacked by tif"> or more powers.

Such an agree

ment could maintain the world balance of power and could
easily obtain the approval of public opinion since the agree
ment would insure

peace and no combination of powers would

consider attacking such a powerful alliance.

Holstein said

that, unfortunately, such an understanding was unlikely
while Salisbury remained In power; however, Germany could
wait until a more opportune time for the conclusion of an
agreement.

Buelow approved Holstein’s memorandum and stated

that the Vortragender R a t 1s views supported Germany’s policy
of seeking Russian friendship, while still hoping for the
possibility of an alliance with Britain.

Germany, the Chan

cellor said, "must make hope glitter on the horizon," thereby
^^Qooah, Holstein Oracle, p. I4.68. J
G. P>., W I T ,
101-106.
History of The Times, III, 32L|.-29, 3k7-k®'
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preventing Britain from co-operating with R u s s i a * ^
Holstein1s hope of gaining British support through
Chirol1s newspaper articles proved impossible when Chamberlain, in a speech at Edinburgh, created an antagonism be
tween Pritain and Per/; any that nearly equaled that following
th© Kruger telegram*^7

On October

Chamberlain spoke in

defense of Britain1s harsh methods in suppressing the Boors*
British actions, th© Colonial Secretary stated, were still
below th© precedents established by other nations in time of
war*

He gave Germany during the war against France in 1870

as an example, but he also referred to th© war practices of
other nations*28
German public opinion reacted violently and accused
Chamberlain of attacking the honor of the Germany army*

The

Kaiser and Buelow, as well as Holstein, also expressed shock
at Chamberlain *s speech.

The issue disturbed Anglo-German

relations from November, 1901, to February, 1902, and re
sulted in Buelow attacking the British in the Reichstag as
t*ell as th© Kaiser demanding a formal
was

a p o l o g y .

29

chamberlain

lust as furious as th© Germans and felt that an alliance
26Ibld., 332-30.

G.

T-VTT, 1C6-IC9.

^Rlolctcln Papers, IV, 2!j7«
^Ga n g e r ,

Diplomacy, II, 7?ll»

^ History of The Vimcs, III, 337-3’".
G. I ., XVII,
I9U-200.
B." D . , I, 261-felt.
Holstein Papers. TV,
2 3 < b -i|0 ,
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with Germany was impossible.30

In such an antagonistic

atmosphere an alliance appeared unlikely, but, at this time,
Lansdowne and the British Foreign Office were again serious lj
*31
considering a defensive agreement with Germany
Lan & d ovrtie belie v e cl tn a t the a 111 arc e d 4 scuss 1on a had
never been formally closed and was under the impress!on that
the Germans would return to the subject in the fall.
the Germans had not resumed the alliance negotiations,

Since
the

British Foreign Secretary felt that he should again raise
the question or that Germany might accuse Britain of sud
denly breaking off negotiations in an unfriendly manner.
Lansdowne had also received information that Germany was
still interested in an agreement, and he felt that, to avoid
any misunderstanding, the Germans should be informed of the
British posit!on.32
Th© British, began to reconsider an alliance with
Germany in November.

Lansdowne drew up an elaborate memo

randum reviewing the 1901 negotiations and the possibility
of an alliance with Germany.

He also instructed Sir Frances

Bertie, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, to draw up a memorandum on th© merit© of an agree30:U
II, 376-80.

, XVTT, 197-2G0.
Eckardstein, Er1n n erungen,
Amery, height of Power, IV, 169-70, 186-81.

3*B. D . , II, 76-79.
PI;-”'5.

32ibid., 73-79.
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ment.

Bertie and Lansdowne agreed that an alliance was im

possible, and Salisbury was definitely opposed to an agree
ment.

Lord Lansdown© hoped that possibly the two governments

might consider a limited agreement over a particular issue;
however, Salisbury even opposed that idea.33

As Lansdown©

.stated, an alliance with Germany was 11a very stiff fence to
ride at.”311
On December 19, Lansdowne met with Count Kettornich
and Informed, him of the British position.
versation,

During their con

th© two men reviewed the alliance negotiations

since the discusslens began in March.

Fetteroich agreed with

Lansdown© that th© German terms war© for © defensive alliance
between Great Britain and the Triple Alliance.

The British

Foreign Secretary staged that Britain desired an under
standing, but th© opposition of public opinion and th© un
obtainable sanction of Parliament orevented the conclusion
of an agreement.

He hoped that possibly some limited agree

ment on a particular issue might be concluded.

Mettemloh

replied that ha was disappointed that the British had refused
such a favorable opportunity for the conclusion of an agree
ment.

Such an opportunity might not again occur.

The Am

bassador remarked the b, since Britah) had refused to conclude
an understanding, Germany would probably move closer to
Russia.

Both men agreea that at the present time eircum33 b .

d

., II, 73-79.
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stances appeared unfavorable for an agreement.

As to th©

possibility of a limited agreement, Ketternlch replied, that
the Berlin Foreign Office was not receptive to such an idea
and wit was a case of the *whole or none.'”

Britain would

not join the Triple Alliance, and Germany would not consider
an agreement on any other terms.

Thus ended the Anglo-

German attempt at an alliance in 1901.35
Count Metternich communicated the substance of his
conversation to the German Foreign Office, where it was felt
that he had conducted himself in proper fashion.

The Berlin

Office expressed some shock that Lansdowne had again raised
the subject of an alliance.

They believed that the discus

sions had ended In June when Britain had failed to renew th©
negotiations*3^

Holstein felt that the alliance discussions

had ended with Hatzfeldt* s recall and expressed some distress
that the British had returned to the issue.

He believed

that it was a possible attempt on the part of Salisbury to
snub

th©

G e r m a n s .37

The alliance discussions ended on a positive note
and failed to indicate any great change in policy or rela
tions on th© part of either the British or German govern
ments.

At the end of 1901 th© Kaiser and King Edward VII
3^1bid., 80-83.
36ibid.

G. P., XVII, 111-15.

B. D. II, 83-81*.

3^1 bid. , 3)(.-86.

137
exchanged letters expressing a desire for better relations
and a possible future a g r e e m e n t .3 ®
downe expressed similar hopes.39

The Chancellor and Lans
Holstein held a similar

opinion and wrote Chirol that the public antagonism, which
resulted from Chamberlain’s speech against the German army
and Buelow1s retaliations In the Reichstag, prevented the
conclusion of an alliance#

In the letter to Chirol, he said

that he always favored an understanding with Britain and
that he would always work for better relations and the con
clusion of an alliance between Great Britain and G e r m a n y . ^
Holstein believed that the failure to conclude a
British alliance, which he had doubted as being possible, had
in no way hindered th© conclusion of an agreement In the fu
ture or that th© failure required Germany to change her
policy toward the British.

Britain would again seek an alli

ance with Germany and on German t e r m s . W

The main objective

of German policy, he asserted, was to remain on friendly
terms with Great Britain.

British friendship was obtainable

by removing th© antagonism caused by the Buelow-Chamberlain
feud and avoiding all action that might cause further dis
trust between the two nations.

Germany, Holstein believed,

38 a. P., XVII, 109-111.

13I+-35.

Lee, Kin* Edward, II.

“
39b.
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could look to th© future with optimism and th© real possibil
ity of obtaining a British a l l i a n c e . ^

^ I b l d . , IV, 257ff.

CHAPTKH VI
CONCLUSIONS
The alliance negotiations of 1901 between ^reat
Britain and -rrmany failed to resii.lt 1r an v.rd.erstanding.
.During the negotiations D e m a n policy, to a great extent,
was determined by r*riedr1 ch von Holet-elr*.

^.a fact t b at

Holstein was merely a Voptragender Eat had very little ef
fect In limiting his Influence and may have enhanced his
ability to gain control of G o m a n policy.

He was able to

secure his extensive power as the Chancellors follow*rg Bis
marck were not well-informed on foreign affairs nrd were,
as a. result, forced to depend more upon the advice of the
Foreign Office#

An the most- informed Vortragender Bat In

the Wilhelmstrasse, Folsteir obtained a considerable influ
ence over the direction of foreign policy.
In 1901 Holstein determined much of the German policy
toward an alliance with Great Britain.

Buelow had placed

the alliance question in the hands of Holstein, end the Chan
cellor had generally followed the Yortragender H a t 1s advice
during the negotiations#
randa

In numerous dispatches and memo

Holstein influenced Germany’s policy by stipulating

and justifylrg the German terms for an alliance.

His de

tailed explanations of how the negotiations should be con139

IkO
ducted and his almost day-to-day instructions enabled him to
maintain as strict a control over the alliance negotiations
as could be exercised from the Berlin Foreign Office.
More Important than Holstein's method of influencing
Germany's alliance policy was his influence on the success
or failure of the alliance negotiations.

Holstein always

desired an alliance wi th Great Britain, but in 1901 he felt
that such an understanding was improbable•

He believed that

the British would not accept Germany's terms and that the
opposition of Salisbury would prevent
agreement.

the conclusion of an

In addition the Vortragender Bat felt that there

was no great need for © British alliance In 1901, and he was
confident that Britain, at sore future time, would seek an
alliance on German terms.

His skepticism about the possi

bility of concluding an understanding governed German policy
and, at least from the German pclnt of view, prevented th©
conclusion of an alliance with Great Britain in 1901.
Holstein's influence on Germany's alliance policy
was not the only factor that prevented an Anglo-German under
standing.

Like Holstein, th© British were skeptical about

the prospect of concluding an agreement, but the opposition
of Salisbury assured the impossibility of an alliance.

An

other reason that contributed to the unsuccessful conclusion
of an alliance was the damage to Anglo-German relations that
resulted from the actions of the Kaiser.

More detrimental

to an understanding was the steady growth of a feeling of

llfl
distrust between the two governments and the antagonistic
public opinion in both countries*

These factors, plus

Holstein's opposition, prevented an alliance in 1901 but did
not necessarily mean that the conclusion of an aliianee was
impossible during the period from 1901 to the outbreak of
World War I .
A number of historians, besides feeling that Holstein
prevented an understanding in 1901, believe that th© failure
to obtain an Anglo-German alliance is th© greatest error in
Imperial German foreign policy.

They believe this because

no other serious attempt was made to secure an alliance
after 1901.

These historians reason that, had an alliance

been concluded In 1901, Britain would not have turned to
Prance and Russia for support.

As a result they suggest that

1901 is the turning point in Anglo-German relations and that
from that time World War I appeared inevitable.

These his

torians, however, misinterpret th© significance of the un
successful alliance negotiations and Anglo-German relations,
as well as European relations, In 1901 and following years.
The failure to conclude an alliance did not result in a
sharp break between Greet Britain and Germany.

In 1901 and

Immediately thereafter there was no Indication that Britain
would move toward Prance and Russia instead of Germany and
not conclude an Anglo-German alliance.

In these circum

stances Holstein's reluctance to seriously consider a Brit
ish alliance and the failure of an tinders tending in 1901 did

lipS
not prevent a later agreement or make World War I inevitable*
One of the remarkable aspects of the 1901 negotia
tions is that Holstein was able to formulate much of th©
German policy toward Great Britain.

A mere Vortragender

Rat in the Berlin Foreign Office had obtained such, great in
fluence that he could, and did, determine the course of Ger
man policy in the alliance negotiations,

whether or not

Holstein's influence on foreign affaire was positive or
negative will long remain a controversial question.

What Is

not controversial is that responsible individuals In the
German government permitted such a person as Holstein to
wield extensive power, without at the same time accepting
a corresponding degree of public responsibility.

Nothing

better Illustrates the above fact than th© ability of Fried
rich vor Holstein to avoid the responsibility for his ac
tions while determining much of German policy in th© 1901 al
liance negotiations between Great Britain and Germany.
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China in 1901*
Lepsius, Johannes Bartholdy, Albrecht Mendelssohn, and
Thimme, Friedrich.
(eds.).
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